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Modern browsers give access to several attributes that can be collected to form a browser fingerprint. Although
browser fingerprints have primarily been studied as a web tracking tool, they can contribute to improve the
current state of web security by augmenting web authentication mechanisms. In this paper, we investigate the
adequacy of browser fingerprints for web authentication. We make the link between the digital fingerprints
that distinguish browsers, and the biological fingerprints that distinguish Humans, to evaluate browser
fingerprints according to properties inspired by biometric authentication factors. These properties include
their distinctiveness, their stability through time, their collection time, their size, and the accuracy of a simple
verification mechanism. We assess these properties on a large-scale dataset of 4, 145, 408 fingerprints composed
of 216 attributes, and collected from 1, 989, 365 browsers. We show that, by time-partitioning our dataset,
more than 81.3% of our fingerprints are shared by a single browser. Although browser fingerprints are known
to evolve, an average of 91% of the attributes of our fingerprints stay identical between two observations, even
when separated by nearly 6 months. About their performance, we show that our fingerprints weigh a dozen
of kilobytes, and take a few seconds to collect. Finally, by processing a simple verification mechanism, we
show that it achieves an equal error rate of 0.61%. We enrich our results with the analysis of the correlation
between the attributes, and of their contribution to the evaluated properties. We conclude that our browser
fingerprints carry the promise to strengthen web authentication mechanisms.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Web authentication widely relies on the use of identifier-password pairs defined by the end user.
The password authentication factor is easy to use and to deploy, but has been shown to suffer from
severe security flaws when used without any additional factor. Real-life users indeed use common
passwords1, which paves the way to brute-force or guessing attacks [8]. Moreover, they tend to use
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similar passwords across different websites [12], which increases the impact of successful attacks.
Phishing attacks are also a major threat to the use of passwords. Over the course of a year, Thomas
et al. [46] achieved to retrieve 12.4 million credentials stolen by phishing kits.
These flaws bring the need for supplementary security layers, primarily through multi-factor
authentication [9], such that each additional factor provides an additional security barrier. However,
this usually comes at the cost of usability (i.e., users have to remember, possess, or do something),
and of deployability (i.e., implementers have to deploy dedicated hardware or software, teach users
how to use them, and maintain the deployed solution).
In the meantime, browser fingerprinting [28] gains more and more attention. The seminal Panop-
ticlick study [13] is the first work to highlight the possibility to build a browser fingerprint by
collecting attributes from a browser (e.g., the userAgent property of the navigator JavaScript
object). In addition to being widely used for web tracking purposes [14] (raising legal, ethical, and
technical issues), browser fingerprinting is already used as an additional web authentication factor
in real-life. The browser fingerprints constitute a supplementary factor that is verified at login
with the other factors, as depicted in Figure 1 (see Appendix C for an example of an authentication
mechanism that relies on browser fingerprints). Browser fingerprints are indeed a good candidate
as an additional web authentication factor thanks to their distinctive power, their frictionless
deployment (e.g., no additional software or hardware to install), and their usability (no secret
to remember, no additional object to possess, and no supplementary action to carry out). As a
result, companies like MicroFocus2 or SecureAuth3 include this technique into their authentication
mechanisms.
However, to the best of our knowledge, no large-scale study rigorously evaluates the adequacy of
browser fingerprints as an additional web authentication factor. On the one hand, most works about
the use of browser fingerprints for authentication concentrate on the design of the authentication
mechanism [17, 26, 34, 38, 43, 47]. On the other hand, the large-scale empirical studies on browser
fingerprints focus on their effectiveness as a web tracking tool [13, 19, 29, 35]. Such a mismatch
between the understanding of browser fingerprints for authentication – currently poor – and
their ongoing adoption in real-life is a serious harm to the security of web users. The lack of
documentation from the existing authentication tools (e.g., about the used attributes, about the
distinctiveness and the stability of the resulting fingerprints) only adds up to the current state
of ignorance, all this whereas security-by-obscurity directly contradicts the most fundamental
security principles. Moreover, the distinctiveness of browser fingerprints that can be achieved
when considering a wide-surface of fingerprinting attributes on a large population is, to the best
of our knowledge, unknown. On the one hand, the studies that analyze browser fingerprints in a
large-scale (more than 100, 000 fingerprints) consider fewer than thirty attributes [13, 19, 29, 48].
This underestimates the distinctiveness of the fingerprints (e.g., [19] reports a rate of 33.6% of
unique fingerprints), as it increases the chances for browsers to share the same fingerprint. All this
whereas more than a hundred attributes are accessible. On the other hand, the studies that consider
more than fifty attributes either work on less than two thousands browsers [24, 35], or do not
analyze the resulting fingerprints at all [3]. The current knowledge about the hundreds of accessible
attributes (e.g., their stability, their collection time, their correlation) is, to the best of our knowledge,
also incomplete. Indeed, previous studies consider few attributes [10, 13, 15, 19, 29, 33, 36, 41], or
focus on a single aspect of them (e.g., their stability [48]).
Our contributions.We conduct the first large-scale data-centric empirical study of the funda-
mental properties of browser fingerprints when used as an additional web authentication factor. We
2 https://www.microfocus.com/media/white-paper/device-fingerprinting-for-low-friction-authentication-wp.pdf
3 https://docs.secureauth.com/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=33063454
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article . Publication date: June 2020.
A Large-scale Empirical Analysis of Browser Fingerprints Properties for Web Authentication 3
Fig. 1. A simplified web authentication mechanism that relies on browser fingerprinting.
base our findings on an in-depth analysis of a real-life fingerprint dataset collected over a period of
6months, that contains 4, 145, 408 fingerprints composed of 216 attributes. In particular, our dataset
includes nine dynamic attributes of three types, which values depend on instructions provided
by the fingerprinter: five HTML5 canvases [10], three audio fingerprinting methods [36], and a
WebGL canvas [33]. The dynamic attributes are used within state-of-the-art web authentication
mechanisms to mitigate replay attacks [26, 38]. Each dynamic attribute has been studied singularly,
but their fundamental properties have not yet been studied simultaneously on the same browser
population. To the best of our knowledge, no related work considers a dataset of this scale, in terms
of both fingerprints and attributes, together with various dynamic attributes. We formalize, and
assess on our dataset, the properties necessary for paving the way to elaborate browser fingerprint-
ing authentication mechanisms. We make the link between the digital fingerprints that distinguish
browsers, and the biological fingerprints that distinguish Humans, to evaluate browser fingerprints
according to properties inspired by biometric authentication factors [16, 31, 52]. We stress that
we do not make any assumption on the inner working of the authentication mechanism, and
consequently on the adversarial strategy. The properties aim at characterizing the adequacy and
the practicability of browser fingerprints, independently of their use within future authentication
mechanisms. In particular, we measure the size of the browser anonymity sets through time, the
proportion of identical attributes between two observations of the fingerprint of a browser, the
collection time of the fingerprints, their size, the loss of efficacy between device types, and the
accuracy of a simple illustrative verification mechanism. To comprehend the obtained results on
the complete fingerprints, we include an in-depth study of the contribution of the attributes to the
fingerprint properties. Moreover, we discuss the correlation between the attributes, make a focus on
the contribution of the dynamic attributes, and provide the exhaustive list of the attributes, together
with their properties. To the best of our knowledge, no previous work analyzed browser finger-
printing attributes at this scale, in terms of the number of attributes, of the number of fingerprints,
and of the variety of properties (e.g., stability, collection time).
In a nutshell, we make the following contributions:
(1) We formalize the fundamental properties that browser fingerprints should provide to be
usable and practical as a web authentication factor.
(2) About their adequacy, we show that (1) considering a wide surface of 216 fingerprinting
attributes on our large population provides a proportion of unique fingerprints – also called
unicity rate – of 81.8% on our complete dataset, (2) by time-partitioning our dataset, the
unicity rates are stable on the long term at around 81.3%, and 94.7% of our fingerprints are
shared by 8 browsers or fewer, (3) on average, a fingerprint has more than 91% of identical
attributes between two observations, even when separated by nearly 6months, (4) our mobile
browsers lack distinctiveness, as they show a unicity rate of 42%.
(3) About their practicability, we show that (1) the generated fingerprints weigh a dozen of
kilobytes, (2) they are collected within seconds, (3) the accuracy of a simple illustrative
verification mechanism is close to perfect, as it achieves an equal error rate of 0.61%.
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(4) We enrich our results with (1) a precise analysis of the contribution of each attribute (a) to
the distinctiveness, and show that 10% of the attributes provide a normalized entropy higher
than 0.25, (b) to the stability, and show that 85% of the attributes stay identical for 99% of the
consecutive fingerprints coming from the same browser, (c) to the collection time, and show
that only 33 attributes take more than 5ms to collect, (d) to the fingerprint size, and show
that only 20 attributes weigh more than 100 bytes, (2) a discussion about the correlation of
the attributes, and show that only 49 attributes can completely be inferred when knowing
another attribute, (3) a focus on the properties of the nine dynamic attributes.
(5) We provide an in-depth description of our methodology and our dataset with the goal of
making our results reproducible. In particular, we include an exhaustive list of the collected
attributes together with their properties, and a detailed description of the preprocessing of
the fingerprints.
This paper is a major extension of work originally presented in [5], and brings more than 50% of
new material. Specifically, we clarify the obtained results by discussing them further, we evaluate
the accuracy of a simple illustrative verification mechanism, we highlight the contribution of the
attributes to the properties, and we provide a comprehensive list of the attributes, together with
their properties and their concrete implementation. In a summary, we make the following additions:
(1) Section 2 gains a description of the studied browser population. This includes the share of
the families of browser and of operating system, and insights about the bias towards French
browsers. We also add a description of the data preprocessing step, and a comparison between
our dataset and the dataset of previous studies.
(2) Section 3 gains the accuracy of a simple illustrative verification mechanism as an additional
performance property.
(3) Section 4 gets the results further discussed, and gains the results of the accuracy of the simple
illustrative verification mechanism.
(4) Section 5 is entirely new. It discusses the contribution of the attributes to the fingerprint
properties, the correlation between the attributes, and the properties of the dynamic attributes.
(5) Section 6 is also new, and provides related works about the use of browser fingerprinting for
authentication.
(6) The appendices are also new. Appendix A describes the concrete implementation of the
studied attributes for reproducibility. Appendix B provides the keywords used to classify the
fingerprints. Appendix C describes how browser fingerprints can be integrated into a web
authentication mechanism. Appendix D discusses a more complex verification mechanism
that rely on distance functions on the attributes to compare fingerprints. Appendix E provides
the complete list of the attributes with their properties (e.g., number of distinct values,
stability).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset analyzed in this
study. Section 3 presents and formalizes the properties evaluated in the analysis. Section 4 presents
the experimental results. Section 5 breaks down the analysis to the attributes to comprehend the
results on the complete fingerprints. Section 6 positions this study with the related works. Finally,
Section 7 concludes.
2 DATASET
In this section, we describe the browser fingerprint dataset that is analyzed in this study. First, we
present the conditions of the collection, and describe the precautions taken to protect the privacy
of the experimenters. Then, we detail the preprocessing steps to cleanse the raw dataset. Finally,
we describe the working dataset, and compare it with the large-scale datasets of previous studies.
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2.1 Fingerprints collection
To study the properties of browser fingerprints on a real-world browser population, we launched an
experiment in collaboration with the authors of the Hiding in the Crowd study [19], together with
an industrial partner that controls one of the top 15 French websites according to the site ranking
service Alexa4. The authors of the Hiding in the Crowd study only consider the 17 attributes of
their previous work [29], and focus on the issue of web tracking. On the contrary, we consider in
this work more than one order of magnitude more attributes – 216 attributes – and focus on the
use of browser fingerprinting as an additional web authentication factor.
2.1.1 Experiment. The experiment consisted into integrating a fingerprinting script on two general
audience web pages that are controlled by our industrial partner, which subjects are political news
and weather forecast. The script was active between December 7, 2016, and June 7, 2017, and
fingerprinted the visitors who consented to the use of cookies in compliance with the European
directives 2002/58/CE and 2009/136/CE. To differentiate two browsers in future analysis, we assigned
them a unique identifier (UID) as a 6-months cookie, whichwas sent alongside fingerprints. Similarly
to previous studies [13, 29], we coped with the issue of cookie deletion by storing a one-way
hash of the IP address as well, computed by a secure cryptographic hash function. We refer the
interested reader to Section 2.3 for more details on the measures taken to protect the privacy of the
experimenters.
2.1.2 Browser fingerprinting attributes. The fingerprinting script used in the experiment includes
216 attributes divided into 200 JavaScript properties, together with their collection time, and 16
HTTP header fields. In particular, they include three types of dynamic attributes that comprise five
HTML5 canvases [10], three audio fingerprinting methods [36], and a WebGL canvas [33].
We sought to evaluate the properties of browser fingerprints when considering as many attributes
as possible, to estimate more precisely what can really be achieved. Hence, we compiled the
attributes from previous studies and open source projects. If the value of an attribute is not
accessible, a flag explaining the reason is stored instead, as it is still exploitable information. Indeed,
two browsers can be distinguished if they behave differently on the inaccessibility of an attribute
(e.g., returning a null value is different from throwing an exception). We also configure a timeout
after which the fingerprint is sent without waiting for every attribute to be collected. The attributes
that were not collected are set to a specific flag. The complete list of attributes and their properties
is available in Appendix E.
Client-side attributes only consist of JavaScript properties. No plugins (e.g., Flash, Silverlight) are
used due to their removal and replacement by HTML5 functionalities5. Moreover, the fingerprinting
script collects the HTTP headers from requests sent by JavaScript, hence the dataset contains no
fingerprint of browsers having JavaScript disabled.
2.2 Browser population bias
The previously presented datasets were collected through dedicated websites, and are biased
towards privacy-aware and technically-skilled persons [13, 29, 35]. Our dataset is more general
audience oriented, and is not biased towards this type of population. Nevertheless, the website
audience is mainly French-speaking users. This leads to biases of which we provide examples here.
By matching the userAgent JavaScript property with manually selected keywords (see Appen-
dix B), we obtain the share of each browser family. Firefox browsers are the most common, and
constitute 31.37% of our desktop browsers, followed by Internet Explorer browsers (28.26%), and
4 https://www.alexa.com/topsites/countries/FR
5 https://theblog.adobe.com/adobe-flash-update
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Chrome browsers (26.22%). Although French users use more Firefox as their desktop browser than
the world average6, the share of browsers is different from what is reported by Statcounter7 with
Chrome being the most common with 68.11% of the French browsers. The operating systems of our
desktop browsers are mostly Microsoft ones, with 39.13% of Windows 10, 35.58% of Windows 7,
and 10.21% of other Windows versions. Mac OS only represents 5.98% of our desktop browsers, and
Linux-based browsers less than 1%. This can be explained by the population visiting the website
being less technically savvy, hence using more common web environments (e.g., a Firefox on a
Windows operating system) than technical environments (e.g., Linux-based operating systems).
For the mobile browsers, the vast majority of them run on an Android platform (84.42%), followed
by Windows Phone (8.76%), and iOS (5.18%). The most common browser is Samsung Browser
(45.10%), followed by Chrome (38.54%), Internet Explorer mobile (8.44%), and Safari (6.70%). The
browsers running on Android devices tend to be more distinguishable than the ones running on
iOS [29], due to the plurality of device vendors and models that embark the Android operating
system.
The contextual attributes related to the time zone or the configured language are less distinctive
than in previous studies (see Section 5.1.1). For example, the normalized entropy of the Timezone
JavaScript property is of only 0.008, against 0.161 for the Panopticlick study [13], and 0.198 for the
AmIUnique study [29]. These attributes also tend towards the typical French values: 98.48% of the
browsers have a Timezone value of −1, 98.59% of them have the daylight saving time enabled, and
fr is present in 98.15% of the value of the Accept-Language HTTP header.
The browsers of our dataset mostly belong to general audience French users. Counter-intuitively,
considering an international population may not reduce the distinctiveness. Indeed, we can expect
foreign users to have a combination of contextual attributes (e.g., timezone, languages) different
from the French users, making them distinguishable even if the remaining attributes have identical
values. Al-Fannah and Li [2] found out that browser families are not equally fingerprintable (e.g.,
Safari browsers are less distinguishable than Chrome browsers). Although the fingerprintability of
the browser families of the studied population impacts the obtained distinctiveness, studying this
aspect is out of the scope of this paper.
2.3 Privacy concerns
The browser fingerprints are sensible due to their identification capacity. We complied with the
European directives 2002/58/CE8 and 2009/136/CE9 in effect at the time, and took additional
measures to protect the participating users.
First, the script was set on two web pages of a single domain in a first-party manner, hence
providing no extra information about the browsing of the users. The content of the web pages
are generic, hence they do not leak any information about the interests of the users. Second, we
restricted the collection to the users having consented to cookies, as required by the European
directives 2002/58/CE and 2009/136/CE. Third, a UID was set as a cookie with a 6-months lifetime,
corresponding to the duration of the experiment. Fourth, we deleted the fingerprints for which the
cookieEnabled property was not set to true. Finally, we hashed the IP addresses by passing them
through a HMAC-SHA256 using a key that we threw afterwards. It was done using the secret
and the hmac libraries of Python3.6. These one-way hashed IP addresses are only used for the UIDs
resynchronization (see Section 2.4.2), and are not used as an attribute in the working dataset.
6 https://gs.statcounter.com/browser-market-share/desktop/worldwide/2020
7 https://gs.statcounter.com/browser-market-share/desktop/france/2020
8 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:02002L0058-20091219
9 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:02009L0136-20091219
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2.4 Data preprocessing
Given the experimental aspect of browser fingerprints, and the scale of our collection, the raw
dataset contains erroneous or irrelevant samples. That is why we perform several preprocessing
steps before any analysis. The dataset is composed of entries in the form of (f ,b, t) tuples so that
the fingerprint f was presented by the browser b at the given time t . We talk here about entries (i.e.,
(f ,b, t) tuples) and not fingerprints (i.e., only f ) to avoid confusion. The preprocessing is divided
into four steps: the cleaning, the UIDs resynchronization, the deduplication, and the derivation of
the extracted attribute. Initially, we have 8, 205, 416 entries in the raw dataset.
2.4.1 Dataset cleaning. The dataset cleaning step filters out 70, 460 irrelevant entries, following
the method described here. The fingerprinting script prepares, sends, and stores the entries in
string format consisting of the attribute values separated by semicolons. We remove 769 entries
that have a wrong number of fields, mainly due to truncated or unrelated data (e.g., the body of
a post request). We filter out 53, 251 entries that belong to robots, by checking that blacklisted
keywords are present in the UserAgent HTTP header (see Appendix B for the keywords list). We
reduce the entries that have multiple exact copies (down to the same moment of collection) to a
single instance. Finally, we remove 18, 591 entries that have the cookies disabled, and 2, 412 entries
that have a time of collection that falls outside the time window of the experiment.
2.4.2 Unique IDs resynchronization. The resynchronization step replaces 181, 676 UIDs with a
total of 116, 708 other UIDs, following the method described here. The cookies are considered
an unreliable browser identification solution, hence we undergo a cookie resynchronization step,
similarly to the Panopticlick study [13]. We consider the entries that have the same (fingerprint, IP
address hash) pair to belong to the same browser, and assign them the same UID. Similarly to the
Panopticlick study, we do not synchronize the interleaved UIDs, that are the UIDs related to the
entries having the same (fingerprint, IP address hash) pairs, but showing UID values b1, b2, then b1
again.
2.4.3 Deduplication. The deduplication step constitutes the biggest cut in our dataset, and filters
out 2, 420, 217 entries. To avoid storing duplicates of the same fingerprint observed several times
for a browser, the usual way is to ignore a fingerprint if it was already seen for a browser during
the collection [13, 29]. Our script collects the fingerprint on each visit, no matter if it was already
seen for this browser or not. To stay consistent with common methodologies, we deduplicate the
fingerprints offline. For each browser, we hold the first entry that contains a given fingerprint, and
ignore the following entries if they also contain this fingerprint. This method takes the interleaved
fingerprints into account, that are the fingerprints so that we observe f1, f2, then f1 again. For
example, if a browser b has the entries {(f1,b, t1), (f2,b, t2), (f2,b, t3), (f1,b, t4)}, we only hold the
entries {(f1,b, t1), (f2,b, t2), (f1,b, t4)} after the deduplication step.
We hold the interleaved fingerprints to realistically simulate the state of the fingerprint of
each browser through time. We find that 10.59% of our browsers showed at least one case of
interleaved fingerprints. The interleaved fingerprints can come from attributes that switch between
two values. An example is the screen size that changes when an external screen is plugged or
unplugged. Previous studies discarded the fingerprints that were already encountered for a given
browser [13, 19, 29], hiding the interleaved fingerprints.
2.4.4 Extracted attributes. We derive 46 extracted attributes of two types from 9 original attributes.
First, we have the extracted attributes that are parts of an original attribute, like an original attribute
that is composed of 28 triplets of RGB (Red Green Blue) color values that we split into 28 single
attributes. Then, we have the extracted attributes that are derived from an original attribute, like
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Table 1. Comparison between the datasets of the studies Panopticlick (PTC), AmIUnique (AIU), Hiding in
the Crowd (HitC), Long-Term Observation (LTO), and this study. As the LTO study tests various attribute
sets, we present the ranges of the results obtained by their attribute selection method. - denotes missing
information. * denotes deduced information. Fps is the short for fingerprints. The attributes comprise the
derived attributes, and the fingerprints are counted after data preprocessing.
PTC [13] AIU [29] HitC [19] LTO [35] This study
Collection period 3 weeks 3-4 months* 6 months 3 years 6 months
Attributes 8 17 17 305 262
Browsers - - - - 1,989,365
Fingerprints 470,161 118,934 2,067,942 88,088 4,145,408
Distinct fingerprints 409,296 142,02310 - 9,822–16,541 3,578,196
Ratio of desktop fps - 0.890* 0.879 0.697*–0.707* 0.805
Ratio of mobile fps - 0.110* 0.121 0.293–0.303 0.134
Unicity of overall fps 0.836 0.894 0.336 0.954–0.958 0.818
Unicity of mobile fps - 0.810 0.185 0.916–0.941 0.399
Unicity of desktop fps - 0.900 0.357 0.974–0.978 0.884
the number of plugins derived from the list of plugins. The extracted attributes do not increase the
distinctiveness as they come from an original attribute, and they are, at most, as distinctive as their
original attribute. However, the extracted attributes can offer a higher stability than their original
attribute, as the latter is impacted by any little change among the extracted attributes. For example,
if exactly one of the 28 RGB values changes between two fingerprint observations, the original
attribute is counted as having changed, but only one of the extracted attributes will be.
2.4.5 Working dataset. The working dataset obtained after the preprocessing steps contains
5, 714, 738 entries (comprising the identical fingerprints that are interleaved for each browser), with
4, 145, 408 fingerprints (comprising no identical fingerprint for each browser), and 3, 578, 196 distinct
fingerprints. They are composed of 216 original attributes and of 46 extracted attributes, for a total
of 262 attributes. The fingerprints come from 1, 989, 365 browsers, 27.53% of which have multiple
fingerprints. Table 1 displays a comparison between the dataset of the studies Panopticlick [13],
AmIUnique [29], Hiding in the Crowd [19], Long-Term Observation [35], and this study.
2.5 Comparison with previous studies
We compare our working dataset with the datasets of previous studies in Table 1, notably by the
unicity rate, which is the proportion of the fingerprints that have been observed for a single browser
only.
We have a lower unicity rate compared to previous studies [13, 29] due to our larger population.
Even if our unicity rate is lower than that of AmIUnique, the gap is not extremely wide. This is
due to the fact that considering a larger browser population leads to higher chances of collision,
reducing the unicity rate. However, by considering a wider surface of fingerprinting attributes, we
reduce these chances. These two effects produce this slight decrease of the unicity rate. We also
observe a lower unicity rate for the fingerprints of mobile browsers compared to the fingerprints
of desktop browsers, confirming the findings of previous studies [13, 19, 29, 42].
10 This number is displayed in Figure 11 of [29] as the number of distinct fingerprints, but it also corresponds to the number
of raw fingerprints collected. Every fingerprint would be unique if the number of distinct and of collected fingerprints are
equal. Hence, we are not confident in this number, but it is the number provided by the authors.
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The authors of the Hiding in the Crowd study [19] worked on fingerprints collected from
the same experiment and browser population than ours. However, to stay consistent with their
previous study [29], they consider the same set of 17 attributes. This explains the higher number
of fingerprints, as two browsers that have different fingerprints for a given set of attributes can
come to the same fingerprint if a subset of these attributes is considered. Hence, they remove
more duplicated fingerprints than us due to the higher chances for a browser to present the same
fingerprint for 17 attributes than for 216 attributes. Our unicity rate is also higher, being at 81.8% for
the complete dataset against 33.6% for [19]. This is due to the larger set of considered attributes that
distinguish browsers more efficiently, as each additional attribute can provide a way to distinguish
browsers. Our little drops on the proportion of desktop and mobile browsers come from a finer-
grained classification, as we have 4.8% of the browsers that are classified as belonging to tablets,
smart TVs, and game consoles.
3 AUTHENTICATION FACTOR PROPERTIES
Biometric authentication factors and browser fingerprints share strong similarities. They both work
by extracting features from a unique entity, which is a person for the former and a browser for
the latter, that can be used for identification or authentication. Although the entity is unique, the
extracted features are a digital representation of the entity, that can lead to imperfections (e.g., the
fingerprints of two different persons can show similar representations). Previous studies [16, 31, 52]
identified the properties for a biometric characteristic to be usable11 as an authentication factor, and
the additional properties for a biometric authentication scheme to be practical. We evaluate browser
fingerprints according to these properties, because of their similarity with biometric authentication
factors.
The four properties needed for a biometric characteristic to be usable as an authentication factor
are the following.
• Universality: the characteristic should be present in everyone.
• Distinctiveness: two distinct persons should have different characteristics.
• Permanence: the same person should have the same characteristic over time. We rather use
the term stability.
• Collectibility: the characteristic should be collectible and measurable.
The three properties that a biometric authentication scheme requires to be practical are the
following.
• Performance: the scheme should be accurate, consume few resources, and be robust against
environmental changes.
• Acceptability: the users should accept to use the scheme in their daily lives.
• Circumvention: it should be difficult for an attacker to deceive the scheme.
The properties that we study are the distinctiveness, the stability, and the performance. We consider
that the universality and the collectibility are satisfied, as the HTTP headers that are automatically
sent by browsers constitute a fingerprint. However, we stress that a loss of distinctiveness occurs
when no JavaScript attribute is available. About the circumvention, we refer the reader to Laperdrix
et al. [26] that analyzed the security of an authentication mechanism based on browser fingerprints.
We let the evaluation of the acceptability as future works, but we stress that such mechanisms are
already used in real-life [50].
11 Here, usable refers to the adequacy of the characteristic to be used for authentication, rather than the ease of use by the
users.
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3.1 Distinctiveness
To satisfy the distinctiveness property, the browser fingerprints should distinguish two different
browsers. The two extreme cases are every browser sharing the same fingerprint, which makes
them indistinguishable from each other, and no two browsers sharing the same fingerprint, making
every browser distinguishable. The distinctiveness falls between these extremes, depending on
the attributes and the browser population. We consider the use of browser fingerprinting as an
additional authentication factor. Hence, we do not require a perfect distinctiveness, as it is used in
combination with other authentication factors to improve the overall security.
The dataset entries are composed of a fingerprint, the source browser, and the moment of
collection in the form of a Unix timestamp in milliseconds. We denote B the domain of the unique
identifiers, F the domain of the fingerprints, and T the domain of the timestamps. The fingerprint
dataset is denoted D, and is formalized as:
D = {(f ,b, t) | f ∈ F ,b ∈ B, t ∈ T } (1)
We use the size of the browser anonymity sets to quantify the distinctiveness, as the browsers
that belong to the same anonymity set are indistinguishable. We denote B(f ,D) the function that
returns the browsers that provided the fingerprint f in the dataset D. It is formalized as:
B(f ,D) = {b ∈ B | ∀(д,b, t) ∈ D, f = д} (2)
We denote A(ϵ,D) the function that provides the fingerprints that have an anonymity set of
size ϵ (i.e., that are shared by ϵ browsers) in the dataset D. It is formalized as:
A(ϵ,D) = { f ∈ F | card(B(f ,D)) = ϵ} (3)
A common measure of the fingerprint distinctiveness is the unicity rate [13, 19, 29], which is the
proportion of the fingerprints that were observed for a browser only. We denoteU(D) the unicity
rate of the dataset D, which is formalized as:
card(A(1,D))
card(F ) (4)
Previous studies measured the anonymity set sizes on the whole dataset [13, 19, 29]. We measure
the anonymity set sizes on the fingerprints currently in use by each browser, and not on their
whole history. Two different browsers, sharing the same fingerprint on different time windows,
are then distinguishable (e.g., a browser was updated before the other). Moreover, a browser that
runs in a fancy web environment (e.g., having a custom font), and that has several fingerprints in
the dataset (e.g., fifty), will bloat the proportion of unique fingerprints, biasing the study (e.g., fifty
fingerprints are unique whereas they come from a single browser).
We evaluate the anonymity set sizes on the time-partitioned datasets composed of the last
fingerprint seen for each browser at a given time. Let Sτ (D) be the time-partitioned dataset
originating from D that represents the state of the fingerprint of each browser after τ days. With
tτ the last timestamp of this day, we have:
Sτ (D) = {(fi ,bj , tk ) ∈ D | ∀(fp ,bq , tr ) ∈ D,bj = bq , tr ≤ tk ≤ tτ } (5)
3.2 Stability
To satisfy the stability property, the fingerprint of a browser should stay sufficiently similar between
two observations to be recognizable. Browser fingerprints have the particularity of evolving through
time, due to changes in the web environment, like a software update or a user configuration. We
measure the stability by the average similarity between the consecutive fingerprints of browsers,
given the elapsed time between their observation. The two extreme cases are every browser holding
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the same fingerprint through its life, and the fingerprint changing completely on each observation. A
lack of stability makes it harder to recognize the fingerprint of a browser between two observations.
We denote C(∆,D) the function that provides the pairs of consecutive fingerprints of D that
are separated by a time-lapse comprised in the ∆ time range. It is formalized as:
C(∆,D) = {(fi , fp ) | ∀((fi ,bj , tk ), (fp ,bq , tr )) ∈ D2,bj = bq , tk < tr , (tr − tk ) ∈ ∆,
(fc ,bd , te ) ∈ D,bd = bj , fc , fi , fc , fp , tk < te < tr }
(6)
We consider the Kronecker delta δ (x ,y), being 1 if x equals y, and 0 otherwise. We consider
the set Ω of the n used attributes. We denote f [ω] the value taken by the attribute ω for the
fingerprint f . Let sim(f ,д) be a simple similarity function between the fingerprints f and д, which
is formalized as:
sim(f ,д) = 1
n
∑
ω ∈Ω
δ (f [ω],д[ω]) (7)
We define the function avsim(∆,D) that provides the average similarity between the pairs of
the consecutive fingerprints, for a given time range ∆ and a dataset D. It is formalized as:
avsim(∆,D) =
∑
(f ,д)∈C(∆,D) sim(f ,д)
card(C(∆,D)) (8)
3.3 Performance
We consider four aspects of the performance of browser fingerprints for web authentication: their
collection time, their size in memory, the loss of efficacy between different device types, and the
accuracy of a simple illustrative verification mechanism.
Browser fingerprinting can easily be deployed by adding a script on the authentication page, and
by preparing the servers to handle the reception, the storage, and the verification of the fingerprints.
The users solely rely on their regular web browser, and do not have to run any dedicated application,
nor possess a specific hardware, nor undergo a configuration step. The main additional load is on
the supplementary consumption of memory and time resources. Moreover, the web environment
differ between device types (e.g., mobile browsers have more limited functionalities than desktop
browsers) and through time (e.g., modern browsers differ from the browsers from ten years ago),
impacting the efficacy of browser fingerprinting. Finally, we evaluate the accuracy of the verification
under fingerprints evolution, considering a simple illustrative verification mechanism.
3.3.1 Collection time. The browser fingerprints can be solely composed of passive attributes (e.g.,
HTTP headers) that are transmitted along with the communications with the server. In this case, the
fingerprints are collected without the user perceiving any collection time, but major attributes are
put aside. The client-side properties collected through JavaScript provide more distinctive attributes,
at the cost of an additional collection time. We measure the collection time of the fingerprints
considering only the JavaScript attributes, and ignore the HTTP headers that are transmitted
passively.
3.3.2 Size. Browser fingerprinting consumes memory resources on the clients during the buffering
of the fingerprints, on the wires during their sending, and on the servers during their storage. The
memory consumption depends on the storage format of the fingerprints. For example, a canvas can
be stored as an image encoded in a base64 string, or as a hash, which is shorter. A trade-off has
to be done between the quantity of information and the memory consumption. The less memory-
consuming choice is to store the complete fingerprint as a single hash. However, the fingerprints
evolve through time – even more when they are composed of many attributes – which results in
the use of a hash of the complete fingerprint being impractical. Due to the unspecified size of the
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attributes (e.g., the UserAgent specification does not define a size limit12), we measure their size
given a fingerprint dataset.
3.3.3 Loss of efficacy. The loss of efficacy is the loss of stability, of distinctiveness, or of performance
of the fingerprints. It can occur either for a group of browsers (e.g., mobile browsers), or resulting
from changes brought to web technologies.
First, previous works showed differences in the properties of the fingerprints coming from
mobile and desktop devices [19, 29, 42], notably a limited distinctiveness for the mobile browsers.
Following these findings, we compare the properties shown by the mobile and the desktop browsers.
We match keywords on the userAgent JavaScript property (see Appendix B) to differentiate the
browsers running on a desktop or a laptop (referred to as desktops), from the browsers running on
a mobile phone (referred to as mobiles).
Second, browser fingerprinting is closely dependent on the evolution of web technologies. As new
technologies are integrated into browsers, new attributes are accessible, and conversely for removal.
Similarly, functionality updates can lead to a change in the fingerprint properties. For example,
Kurtz et al. [25] detected an iOS update by the sudden instability of an attribute that provides the
iOS version. Following their finding, we verify whether the evolution of web technologies provokes
major losses in the properties of the fingerprints.
3.3.4 Accuracy of a simple verification mechanism. We evaluate the accuracy of the verification
under fingerprints evolution, considering a simple illustrative verification mechanism. This mecha-
nism counts the identical attributes between the presented fingerprint and the stored fingerprint,
and considers the evolution legitimate if this number is above a threshold Θ. The simplicity of this
mechanism gives us an idea of the accuracy that can be easily achieved, without having to engineer
more complex rules. More elaborate mechanisms can obviously be designed (see Appendix D).
4 EVALUATION OF BROWSER FINGERPRINTS PROPERTIES
In this section, we evaluate the browser fingerprints of our dataset according to the distinctiveness,
the stability, and the performance properties. We present here the results on the complete finger-
prints, and let Section 5 provide insights on the contribution of the attributes to each property.
We show that, by time-partitioning our dataset, our fingerprints provide a unicity rate of more
than 81.3%, which is stable through time. However, our fingerprints of mobile browsers are less
distinctive than our fingerprints of desktop browsers, with a respective unicity rate of 42% against
84%, considering the time-partitioned datasets. We also show that, on average, a fingerprint has
more than 91% of identical attributes between two observations, even when separated by nearly
6 months. About their performance, we show that our fingerprints weigh a dozen of kilobytes, and
are collected within seconds. The accuracy of the simple illustrative verification mechanism is close
to perfect, as it achieves an equal error rate of 0.61%. This results from most of the consecutive
fingerprints coming from a browser having at least 234 identical attributes, whereas most of the
fingerprints of different browsers have fewer.
4.1 Distinctiveness
4.1.1 Overall distinctiveness. Figure 2 presents the size of the anonymity sets alongside the fre-
quency of browser arrival for the time-partitioned datasets. The time-partitioned datasets are
designed so that each browser has the last fingerprint observed at the end of the τ -th day. The
overall fingerprints have a stable unicity rate of more than 81.3% for the partitioned-datasets, and
more than 94.7% of the fingerprints are shared by 8 browsers or fewer. The overall fingerprints
12 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7231#section-5.5.3
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Fig. 2. Anonymity set sizes, and frequency of browser arrivals, through the time-partitioned datasets obtained
after each day. The new browsers are displayed in hundreds of thousands.
comprise those collected from desktop and mobile browsers, but also those of tablets, consoles, and
smart TVs. The comparisons are done using fingerprint hashes, resulting in 4 collisions, which we
deem negligible.
The anonymity sets tend to grow as more browsers are encountered, due to the higher chances
of collision. However, the fingerprints tend to stay in small anonymity sets, as can be seen by the
growth of the anonymity sets of size 2 being more important than the growth of the anonymity sets
of size 8 or higher. The unicity rate of the time-partitioned datasets (81.3%) is lower than the unicity
rate of the complete dataset (81.8%). This is due to browsers having multiple unique fingerprints in
the complete dataset, which typically occurs when a browser having a unique web environment is
fingerprinted multiple times. Considering the time-partitioned datasets removes this over-counting
effect.
New browsers are encountered continually. However, starting from the 60th day, the arrival
frequency stabilizes around 5, 000 new browsers per day. Before this stabilization, the arrival
frequency is variable, and has major spikes that seem to correspond to events that happened in
France. These events could lead to more visits, hence explaining these spikes. For example, the spike
on the 38th day corresponds to a live political debate on TV, and the spike on the 43rd correlates
with the announcement of a cold snap.
4.1.2 Distinctiveness of desktop and mobile browsers. Figure 3 presents the unicity rate through the
time-partitioned datasets for the overall, the mobile, and the desktop browsers. The fingerprints of
the mobile browsers are more uniform than the fingerprints of the desktop browsers, with a unicity
rate of approximately 42% against 84%, for the time-partitioned datasets. The unicity rate of the
desktop browsers slightly increases by 1.04 points from the 60th to the 183th day, from 84.99% to
86.03%. On the contrary, the unicity rate of the mobile browsers slightly decreases by 0.29 points
on the same period, from 42.42% to 42.13%.
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Fig. 3. Unicity rate for the overall, the mobile, and the desktop browsers, through the time-partitioned
datasets obtained after each day.
4.2 Stability
Figure 4 displays the average similarity between the pairs of consecutive fingerprints as a function
of the time difference, together with the number of compared pairs for each time difference. The
ranges ∆ are expressed in days, so that day d on the x-axis represents the fingerprints that are
separated by ∆ = [d ;d + 1[ days. We ignore the comparisons of the time ranges that have less
than 10 pairs, to have samples of sufficient size without putting too many comparisons aside.
We also ignore the bogus comparisons that have a time difference higher than the limit of our
experiment (182 days). These two sets of ignored comparisons account for less than 0.03% of each
group. The results are obtained by comparing a total of 3, 725, 373 pairs of consecutive fingerprints,
that include 2, 912, 860 pairs for the desktop browsers, and 594, 591 pairs for the mobile browsers.
Two consecutive fingerprints are necessarily different as we remove the duplicated consecutive
fingerprints (see Section 2.4.3). Considering (f1, f2, f3) the fingerprints collected for a browser,
ordered by the time of collection, the set of consecutive fingerprints is {(f1, f2), (f2, f3)}. Our
stability results are a lower bound, as the consecutive fingerprints are necessarily different (i.e.,
their similarity is strictly lower than 1).
Our fingerprints are stable, as on average more than 91% of the attributes are expected to not
change, considering up to 174 elapsed days (nearly 6months) between two observations. We assume
that the users return more frequently, and otherwise would accept to undergo the account recovery
process (see Appendix C). Moreover, the fingerprints of the mobile browsers are generally more
stable than the fingerprints of the desktop browsers, as suggests their respective similarity curve.
Few attributes of our script are highly unstable. They are discussed in Section 5.1.2. Getting rid
of these attributes could reduce the distinctiveness of the fingerprints, but would improve their
stability.
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Fig. 4. Average similarity between the pairs of consecutive fingerprints as a function of the time difference,
with the number of compared pairs, for the overall, the mobile, and the desktop browsers.
4.3 Performance
4.3.1 Time consumption. Figure 5 displays the cumulative distribution of the collection time of
our fingerprints in seconds, with the outliers removed. We measure the collection time by the
difference between two timestamps, one recorded at the starting of the script, and the other just
before sending the fingerprint. Some values are extremely high, taking from several hours to days.
They can come from a web page put in background, or accessed after a long time. We limit the
results to the fingerprints that take less than 30 seconds to collect, and consider the higher values
as outliers. They account for less than 1% of each group.
Half of our fingerprints are collected in less than 2.92 seconds, and the majority (95%) in less
than 10.42 seconds. The time to collect the fingerprints is lower for the desktop browsers than for
the mobile browsers. Half of the fingerprints of the desktop browsers are collected in less than
2.64 seconds, and the majority (95%) in less than 10.45 seconds. These numbers are respectively
of 4.44 seconds and 10.16 seconds for the mobile browsers. The median collection time of our
fingerprints is less than the estimated median time taken by web pages to load completely [6],
being at 6.5 seconds for the desktop browsers, and 19.7 seconds for the mobile browsers, at the
date of May 1, 2020. The mobile devices have generally less computing power than the desktop
devices, which can explain the longer collection time. The collection time of the fingerprints of the
mobile browsers has less variance than for the desktop browsers, which can be explained by the
former having more uniform computing power than the latter. This is supported by the presence in
our dataset of desktop browsers running on old systems like Windows Vista or Windows XP.
Our script takes several seconds to collect the attributes composing the fingerprints. However,
we stress that this script is purely experimental, and was developed to collect many attributes to
get closer to what a fingerprinter can achieve in real-life. The attributes that are longer to collect
and that are less distinctive can be removed. For example, our method to detect an advertisement
blocker waits a few seconds for a simulated advertisement to be removed, but only provides a
Boolean value. We discuss these cases in Section 5.1.3. Our script can also be updated to leverage
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Fig. 5. Cumulative distribution of the collection time of the fingerprints in seconds.
the most advanced web technologies, like the OffscreenCanvas API13 that migrates the generation
of the canvases off the main thread to another thread. More generally, we can use the Service
Workers API14 to collect the attributes concurrently in the background, reducing the perceived
collection time. These APIs are available on the modern browsers, the collection time should still
be monitored for the older browsers.
4.3.2 Memory consumption. Figure 6 displays the cumulative distribution of the size of our fin-
gerprints in bytes, with the outliers removed. Our fingerprints are encoded in UTF-8 (with only
ASCII characters), hence one character takes one byte, and the results can be expressed in both
units. The canvases are stored as sha256 hashes. The fingerprint sizes comprise the value of the
262 attributes without the metadata fields (e.g., the UID, the timestamp). The average fingerprint
size is of µ = 7, 692 bytes, and the standard deviation is of σ = 2, 294. We remove 1 fingerprint from
a desktop browser considered an outlier due to its size being greater than µ + 15 · σ .
The memory consumption takes place on three components: on the client during the buffering
of the fingerprints, on the wire during their sending, and on the server during their storage. Half of
our fingerprints take less than 7, 550 bytes, 95% less than 12 kilobytes, and all of them less than
22 kilobytes. This is negligible given the current storage and bandwidth capacities. We observe
a difference between the fingerprints of mobile and desktop browsers, with 95% of fingerprints
weighing respectively less than 8, 020 bytes and 12, 082 bytes. This is due to heavy attributes being
lighter on mobiles, like the list of plugins or of mime types that are most of the time empty. We
discuss these cases furtherly in Section 5.1.4.
4.3.3 Accuracy of the simple verification mechanism. The accuracy of the simple illustrative verifi-
cation mechanism is measured according to the following methodology. First, we split our dataset
into six samples, one for each month. We assume that a user would spend at most one month
between two connections, and otherwise would accept to undergo a heavier fingerprint update
13 https://developers.google.com/web/updates/2018/08/offscreen-canvas
14 https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Service_Worker_API
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Fig. 6. Cumulative distribution of the fingerprint size in bytes, for the overall, the mobile, and the desktop
browsers.
process. Two sets are afterward extracted from each sample, and are composed of pairs of com-
pared fingerprints, also called comparisons. The same-browser comparisons are composed of the
consecutive fingerprints of each browser, and the different-browsers comparisons are composed
of two randomly picked fingerprints of different browsers. After constituting the same-browser
comparisons for each month, we sample the different-browsers comparisons to have the same
size as the same-browser comparisons. The month sampling also helps the different-browsers
comparisons to be realistic by pairing fingerprints that are separated by at most one month. Both
the two sets of comparisons contain a total of 3, 467, 289 comparisons.
Figure 7 displays the distribution of the identical attributes between the same-browser compar-
isons and the different-browsers comparisons, starting from 34 identical attributes as there are
no observed value below. Figure 8 presents a focus that starts from 227 identical attributes, below
which there are less than 0.005 of the same-browser comparisons. We can observe that the two sets
of comparisons are well separated, as 99.05% of the same-browser comparisons have at least 234
identical attributes, and 99.68% of the different-browsers comparisons have fewer. The different-
browsers comparisons have generally a fewer, and a more diverse, number of identical attributes
compared to the same-browser comparisons. The different-browsers comparisons have between 34
and 253 identical attributes, with an average of 127.41 attributes, and a standard deviation of 44.06
attributes. The same-browser comparisons have between 72 and 252 identical attributes, with an
average of 248.64 attributes, and a standard deviation of 3.91 attributes.
Figure 9 displays the false match rate (FMR), which is the proportion of the same-browser
comparisons that are classified as different-browsers comparisons, and the false non-match rate
(FNMR), which is the inverse. The displayed results are the average for each number of identical
attributes among the six samples. As there are few same-browser comparisons that have less than
234 identical attributes, the FNMR is null until this value. However, after exceeding this threshold,
the FNMR increases as the same-browser comparisons begin to be classified as different-browsers
comparisons. The equal error rate, which is the rate where both the FMR and the FNMR are equal, is
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Fig. 9. False match rate (FMR) and false non-match rate (FNMR) given the required number of identical
attributes, averaged among the six samples.
of 0.61% and is achieved for 232 identical attributes. Although the verification mechanism does not
have a perfect accuracy of 100%, this is acceptable. Indeed, a user getting his browser unrecognized
can undergo the fallback authentication process [32, 37]. Moreover, we consider the use of browser
fingerprinting as an additional authentication factor, hence the other factors can prevent a falsely
recognized browser. Both these cases are expected to rarely occur as can be seen by the low equal
error rate.
These results are tied to the distinctiveness and the stability of the fingerprints. Indeed, as more
than 94.7% of the fingerprints are shared by less than 8 browsers, two random fingerprints have
little chances to match. Moreover, more than 96.64% of the attributes are identical between the
consecutive fingerprints of a browser, on average and when separated by less than 31 days. This
results in more than 244 identical attributes on average, which is consistent with the 248.64 identical
attributes on average among the same-browser comparisons.
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4.4 Conclusion
About the distinctiveness, and considering the time-partitioned datasets, our fingerprints provide a
unicity rate of more than 81.3%, which is stable on the long-run. Moreover, more than 94.7% of our
fingerprints are shared by at most 8 browsers. About the stability, and on average, a fingerprint has
more than 91% of its attributes that stay identical between two observations, even when separated
by nearly 6 months. About the performance, the majority (95%) of our fingerprints weigh less than
12 kilobytes, and are collected in less than 10.42 seconds. We do not remark any significant loss in
the properties offered by our fingerprints through the 6months of our experiment. However, we fall
to the same conclusion as previous studies [42] about the fingerprints of mobile browsers lacking
distinctiveness. Their unicity rate in the time-partitioned datasets falls down to approximately 42%.
We remark that, in our dataset, the consecutive fingerprints of a browser have at least 234 identical
attributes, whereas the majority of the fingerprints of different browsers have fewer. This results in
our simple verification mechanism achieving an equal error rate of 0.61%.
5 ATTRIBUTE-WISE ANALYSIS
In this section, we discuss the contribution of the attributes to the properties of the fingerprints,
show that most of the attributes are correlated with at least another one (i.e., they provide less
than 1 bit of entropy when the other one is known), and focus on the properties of the dynamic
attributes (e.g., their collection time). We refer the reader to Appendix A for more information
about the implementation of each attribute.
5.1 Contribution of particular attributes
In this section, we discuss the contribution of the attributes to the fingerprint properties of distinc-
tiveness, stability, and performance.We express the stability of the attributes as the proportion of the
consecutive fingerprints where the value of the attribute stays identical, that we call the sameness
rate. Appendix E provides the exhaustive list of the attributes, together with their properties.
5.1.1 Attributes distinctiveness. We measure the distinctiveness of the attributes as the normalized
entropy for comparability with previous studies. The normalized entropy was proposed by Laperdrix
et al. [29] to cope with the problem of comparing the entropy of attributes between fingerprint
datasets of dissimilar sizes. The normalized entropyHn(X ) is defined as the ratio of the entropyH (X )
of the attribute to the maximum entropy HM = log2(N ), with N being the number of fingerprints.
Hence, the entropy can be calculated by H (X ) = Hn(X ) ∗ HM , with HM = 21.983 bits in our case.
For reference, an entropy of 1 bit is equivalent to a normalized entropy of 0.045.
Figure 10 displays the cumulative distribution of the normalized entropy, and of the entropy in
bits, among the attributes. We have 10% of the attributes that provide a low normalized entropy
of less than 0.003, and another 10% that provide a normalized entropy between 0.25 and 0.42.
The majority of the attributes (80%) provide a normalized entropy comprised between 0.003 and
0.25. The most distinctive attributes of previous studies [13, 29] also belong to the most distinctive
attributes of our study. The three canvases are in the 10 most distinctive attributes. Our designed
canvas in PNG has a normalized entropy of 0.420, the canvas similar to the canvas presented in the
Morellian study [26] has a normalized entropy of 0.385, and the canvas inspired by the AmIUnique
study [29] has a normalized entropy of 0.353. The userAgent collected from the JavaScript property
is more distinctive than its HTTP header counterpart, as they respectively have a normalized
entropy of 0.394 and 0.350. Finally, the list attributes are also highly distinctive. The list of plugins
has a normalized entropy of 0.394, the list of supported mime types has a normalized entropy of
0.311, and the list of fonts has a normalized entropy of 0.305.
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Fig. 10. Cumulative distribution of the normalized entropy, and of the entropy in bits, among the attributes.
Table 2 compares the normalized entropy between the studies Panopticlick, AmIUnique, Hiding
in the Crowd, and this study, ranked by the most distinctive attributes of this study. The normalized
entropy of our attributes are lower than what is reported in previous studies [13, 29]. This loss of
normalized entropy can be explained by the following factors. First, the maximum entropy HM
increases with the number of fingerprints. However, an attribute that has n possibilities (e.g., a
Boolean attribute has only two possible values) will have a normalized entropy of at most log2(n).
As the number N of fingerprints increases, the normalized entropy decreases due to the entropy of
the attribute being capped at log2(n) whereas the ratio is to log2(N ). Second, contextual attributes
are biased towards the French-population, as described in Section 2.2, hence they provide a lower
normalized entropy. For example, the time zone and the Accept-Language HTTP header (named
Content language in Table 2) provide a respective normalized entropy of 0.008 and 0.124, against
0.198 and 0.351 for the AmIUnique study [29]. The third reason is the evolution of web technologies
since the Panopticlick and the AmIUnique study. For example, the list of plugins is less distinctive
due to the replacement of plugins15 by HTML5 functionalities or extensions. Another example is
the list of fonts that could be collected through plugins [13], but now it has to be inferred from the
size of text elements [15]. These three reasons partly explain the lower normalized entropy that
our attributes provide compared to previous studies. We emphasize that although the 17 attributes
in common have a lower normalized entropy, we supplement them with more than a hundred
attributes, resulting in the fingerprints showing a unicity rate above 80%.
Interestingly, four attributes unreported by the previous large-scale studies [13, 19, 29] are
found to be highly distinctive. The innerHeight and outerHeight properties of the windows
JavaScript object, mentioned by [40, 49] but without any distinctiveness measure, have a respective
normalized entropy of 0.388 and 0.327. The size of bounding boxes was used by [15] as a method of
font fingerprinting. From the entropy reported by the authors, we obtain a normalized entropy of
15 https://theblog.adobe.com/adobe-flash-update
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Table 2. Comparison of the normalized entropy between the studies Panopticlick (PTC), AmIUnique (AIU),
Hiding in the Crowd (HitC), and this study, ranked by the most distinctive attributes of this study.
Attribute PTC [13] AIU [29] HitC [19] This study
Canvas (PNG) - 0.491 0.407 0.420
Canvas (JPG) - - 0.391 0.399
List of plugins 0.817 0.656 0.452 0.394
User agent 0.531 0.580 0.341 0.350
List of fonts 0.738 0.497 0.329 0.305
Content language - 0.351 0.129 0.124
List of HTTP headers - 0.249 0.085 0.095
Renderer WebGL - 0.202 0.264 0.089
Do Not Track - 0.056 0.091 0.085
Vendor WebGL - 0.127 0.109 0.080
Platform - 0.137 0.057 0.068
Accept - 0.082 0.035 0.028
Content encoding - 0.091 0.018 0.019
Timezone 0.161 0.198 0.008 0.008
AdBlock - 0.059 0.002 0.002
Use of local storage - 0.024 0.002 0.001
Use of session storage - 0.024 0.002 0.000
Cookies enabled 0.019 0.015 0.000 0.000
Maximum entropy HM 18.843 16.859 20.980 21.983
Fingerprints 470,161 118,934 2,067,942 4,145,408
0.761. This attribute has a normalized entropy of 0.369 in our dataset. To the best of our knowledge,
no previous study use the width and the position of a newly created div element as a fingerprinting
attribute. However, it is highly distinctive as it achieves a normalized entropy of 0.324 in our
dataset. All the mentioned attributes provide a sameness rate higher than 90%, except for the
size of bounding boxes that goes down to 47%. However, when looking at its extracted parts, we
observe that they have a sameness rate higher than 90%, at the exception to the height of the first
bounding box that has a sameness rate of 49.04%. This illustrates the necessity of breaking down
some attributes to parts, as removing this part from the original attribute would drastically increase
its sameness rate.
5.1.2 Attributes sameness rate. Figure 11 displays the cumulative distribution of the sameness rate
among the attributes. Only 6 attributes (2.29% of the attributes) provide a lower sameness rate than
85%, 5.7% of the attributes provide a sameness rate comprised in [85; 95]%, 10.7% provide a sameness
rate comprised in [95, 99]%, and more than 80% of the attributes have a sameness rate higher than
99%. The attributes that have a sameness rate lower than 85% are the size of bounding boxes that
was previously explained, three extracted attributes derived from the bounding boxes, and two
other attributes that we describe here. The Cache-Control HTTP header allows the browser to
specify the cache policy used during requests, and is the second most unstable attribute with a
sameness rate of 70.63%. This is due to the fact that this header is not always sent, and some values
contain the max-age parameter that can vary between requests. The third most unstable attribute is
the WebRTC fingerprinting method that has a sameness rate of 76.46%. This is due to three factors.
First, the experimental state of this attribute leads it to be unsupported, undefined, or erroneous
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Fig. 11. Cumulative distribution of the sameness rate of the attributes among the consecutive fingerprints.
for 75.23% of the observed fingerprints. Then, it contains local IP addresses16 which can change
between two observations. Finally, it is composed by numerous information about an instance of a
current WebRTC connection, hence the change of any information changes the value of the whole
attribute.
5.1.3 Attributes collection time. Most of the attributes are HTTP headers or JavaScript properties
that are collected in a negligible amount of time. Only 33 attributes have a median collection
time (MCT) higher than 5ms. Their median collection time is presented in Figure 12, ranked from
the slowest to the fastest to collect for the overall browsers. These attributes can be separated into
three classes: extension detection, browser component, and media related. These attributes wait for
the web page to render, or execute heavy processes (e.g., graphical computation), which explains
their high collection time. Note that most of these attributes are collected asynchronously, hence
the total collection time of the fingerprint is not their sum.
The first class of attributes that take time to be collected are the methods of extension detection.
The 9 slowest attributes detect an extension by the changes it brings to the content of the web
page [44]. They have a MCT of approximately 2.2 seconds, because of the waiting time before
checking the changes on the web page. There is a clear difference between the desktop and the
mobile browsers, with a respective MCT of approximately 2 seconds and 3.4 seconds. The 22nd
to the 29th slowest attributes detect an extension based on web-accessible resources [41], which
consist into checking if an image embarked in an extension is accessible or not. They have a MCT
of around 60ms, which is lower than the method that relies on detecting changes brought to the
web page.
The second class of attributes that take time to be collected infer the availability of browser
components. The list of speech synthesis voices is ranked 14th, and has a MCT of 568ms. This is due
to the collection method that, for some browsers, requires to be done during an onvoiceschanged
16 Our script hashes these local IP addresses in MD5 directly on the client, see [45] for more information about how the
WebRTC API gives access to this information.
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Fig. 12. Median collection time of the 33 attributes that have a median collection time higher than 5ms,
ranked from the slowest to the fastest to collect for the overall browsers, in seconds.
event, which takes time to be triggered. The list of fonts, and the inference of the default font, are
ranked 15th and 19th with a respective MCT of 471ms and 103ms. This is due to the detection
method that measures the size of newly created text boxes [15]. The size of bounding boxes, the
browser component colors, and the width and position of a newly created div element are ranked
18th, 20th, and 21st, with a MCT ranging from 60ms to 200ms. This is due to their manipulation of
the web page that takes time. The WebRTC fingerprinting method is ranked 13th with a MCT of
783ms. This is due to the creation of a dummy connection that is needed to gather information
about the WebRTC configuration.
The third class of attributes that take time to be collected generate a media file (e.g., a sound, an
image), and are discussed inmore detail in Section 5.3. Themethods of advanced audio fingerprinting
are ranked 10th, 11th, and 12th. Our designed canvases are ranked 16th and 17th, the canvases
inspired by the AmIUnique study [29] are ranked 31st and 33rd, and the canvas similar to the
canvas of the Morellian study [26] is ranked 32nd.
5.1.4 Attributes size. Most of our attributes have a negligible median size (MS): 137 attributes have
a MS of less than 5 bytes, 105 attributes have a MS between 5 bytes and 100 bytes, and 20 attributes
have a MS of more than 100 bytes. Figure 13 displays the median size of the 20 heaviest attributes in
bytes, ranked from the heaviest to the lightest for the overall browsers. In this section, we discuss
these 20 heaviest attributes.
The heaviest attributes are composed of list attributes and verbose textual attributes, the three
heaviest attributes being list attributes. The list of the properties of the navigator object is ranked
1st with a MS of 502 bytes, the list of the colors of layout components is ranked 2nd with a MS
of 492 bytes, and the list of WebGL extensions is ranked 3rd with a MS of 401 bytes. Examples of
verbose textual attributes are the appVersion that is ranked 18th with a MS of 107 bytes, and the
userAgent JavaScript property that is ranked 14th with a MS of 115 bytes, which is more verbose
than its HTTP header counterpart that is ranked 19th with a MS of 108 bytes.
On mobile browsers, some list attributes are most of the time empty due to their lack of cus-
tomization (e.g., plugins are mostly unsupported). They are the list of available synthesis voices
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Fig. 13. Median size of the 20 heaviest attributes in bytes, ranked from the heaviest to the lightest for the
overall browsers.
that is ranked 4th, the list of the constraints supported by the mediaDevices object that is ranked
8th, the list of plugins that is ranked 12th, and the list of supported mime types that is ranked
17th. On the contrary, the verbose attributes are slightly heavier on the mobile browsers, which is
explained by the presence of additional information like the device model.
5.2 Correlation between attributes
We can expect to have correlations occurring between the attributes when considering more than
250 attributes. We provide here an overview of the correlation between the attributes, that include
the nine dynamic attributes, and refer the reader to Appendix E for insight into the correlation of
each attribute.
For comparability with the results of the distinctiveness of the attributes, we express the correla-
tion by the conditional entropy of an attribute ai when another attribute aj is known, normalized
to the maximum entropy HM . We call this measure the normalized conditional entropy (NCE). It is
comprised between 0.0 if knowing ai allows to completely infer aj , and the normalized entropy
of aj if knowing ai provides no information on the value of aj (i.e., they are independent). We
denoteVi the domain of the attribute ai , and eiv the event that the attribute ai takes the value v . We
consider the relative frequency p of the attribute values among the considered fingerprints. The
measure of the conditional entropy H(aj |ai ) of aj given ai is expressed as
H(aj |ai ) = −
∑
v ∈Vi ,w ∈Vj
p(eiv , e jw ) log
p(eiv , e jw )
p(eiv )
(9)
Finally, we normalize the conditional entropy H(aj |ai ) by the maximum entropy HM .
Figure 14 displays the minimum, the average, and the maximum NCE of an attribute when the
value of another one of the attributes is known, ordered by the average NCE. We ignore 9 source
attributes from which the extracted attributes are derived, and the comparison of an attribute
with itself. These cases are irrelevant, as the extracted attributes are completely correlated with
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Fig. 14. Minimum, average, and maximum normalized conditional entropy of an attribute when the value of
another attribute is known, ordered by the average normalized conditional entropy.
their source attribute, and an attribute is completely correlated with itself. We obtain a total of
253 attributes. We observe that the maximum NCE of an attribute is always equal to the normalized
entropy of this attribute, due to the cookieEnabled property that is always true. Hence, it provides
a null entropy, and knowing its value does not provide any information on the value of the other
attributes. We recall that the maximum entropy is HM = 21.983 bits, and that a conditional entropy
of 1 bit is equivalent to a NCE of 0.045.
We can see three parts in this figure. First, 19 attributes have a low normalized entropy of less
than 10−3, and the NCE when knowing another attribute is at most as much. Few different values
have been observed for these attributes. Then, 194 attributes have an average NCE between 10−3
and 10−1. The minimum NCE of these attributes is near 0.0, hence there exists another attribute
that can be used to efficiently infer their value. Finally, 40 attributes have an average NCE higher
than 10−1, and generally have a strictly positive minimum NCE. These attributes help to efficiently
distinguish browsers, and are less correlated to other attributes.
The minimum normalized conditional entropy (MNCE) is an interesting indicator of the efficiency
to infer the value of an attribute if the value of another attribute is known.We have 49 attributes that
have a null MNCE, which can completely be inferred when another attribute is known. Moreover,
192 attributes have a MNCE comprised in the range ]0; 0.045], hence knowing the value of another
attribute helps to infer their value, but not completely. Finally, 12 attributes have a MNCE higher
than 0.045, which is equivalent to having a minimum conditional entropy higher than 1 bit. They are
displayed in Table 3. They consist of highly distinctive attributes (see Section 5.1.1) that concern the
size of the screen (e.g., W.screenX) or the window (e.g., W.innerHeight), browser components (e.g.,
fonts, plugins), and verbose information about the browser (e.g., N.userAgent) or about external
components (e.g., WebRTC fingerprinting).
5.3 Focus on dynamic attributes
Previous studies highlight the possibility to fingerprint browsers by rendering media files inside
the browser, given instructions that are provided by the fingerprinter (e.g., WebGL canvas [33],
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Table 3. The attributes that have a minimum normalized conditional entropy (MNCE) higher than 0.045, or a
minimum conditional entropy higher than 1 bit, together with their MNCE and their minimum conditional
entropy in bits. W refers to the window JavaScript object, N refers to the navigator object, WG refers to an
initialized WebGL context, and [...] is a truncated part.
Attribute MNCE Minimum conditional entropy
W.innerHeight 0.181 3.98
WebRTC fingerprinting 0.144 3.17
W.outerHeight 0.117 2.58
Presence of fonts 0.110 2.42
N.plugins 0.100 2.21
W.outerWidth 0.074 1.63
WG.[...].UNMASKED_RENDERER_WEBGL 0.073 1.61
Height of first bounding box 0.070 1.53
S.availHeight 0.058 1.27
W.screenY 0.049 1.08
W.screenX 0.047 1.04
N.userAgent 0.046 1.00
Fig. 15. Our designed HTML5 canvas in PNG format.
Fig. 16. Our designed WebGL canvas in PNG format.
HTML5 canvas [10], audio fingerprinting [36]). Later on, these attributes were integrated within
challenge-response mechanisms [26, 38] that mitigate replay attacks. We call these attributes the
dynamic attributes, and include nine of them in our script: five HTML5 canvases, three audio
fingerprinting methods, and a WebGL canvas. To the best of our knowledge, no study evaluate the
properties of several dynamic attributes on a browser population, together with the evaluation
of various set of instructions. In this section, we seek to fill this gap, and focus on the properties
offered by the nine dynamic attributes of our fingerprinting script.
5.3.1 HTML5 canvas. The HTML5 canvas consists into asking the browser to draw an image by
using the canvas API, within the two-dimensional context called 2d. This method is already studied
in several works, whether it is about its efficacy [10, 19, 29], its use on the web [14, 30], or the
distinctiveness provided by various sets of instructions [26]. However, to the best of our knowledge,
no study evaluates the different properties (e.g., distinctiveness, stability, collection time) offered by
various sets of complex instructions (i.e., mixes of texts, emojis, mathematical curves, drawn using
different colors). We seek to fill this gap, and evaluates the properties of five HTML5 canvases,
generated following three sets of instructions and in two image formats (PNG and JPEG). We name
the canvases given the set of instructions used and their format. We call AmIUnique canvas the
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canvas generated by the set of instructions inspired by the AmIUnique17 study [29], and extracted in
PNG format. We call Morellian canvas the canvas generated by the set of instructions that is similar
to the Morellian study [26], which is extracted in PNG and JPEG formats. We call custom canvas
the canvas generated by a set of instructions that we designed, which is extracted in PNG and
JPEG formats. We collect the canvases by using the toDataURL function. The quality parameter
of this function goes from 0.0 to 1.0, and allow us to control the level of compression of the JPEG
versions. As we seek to compare the PNG canvases that are compressed without loss, with their
JPEG counterparts by using a high level of compression, we set the quality to 0.1 for the JPEG
versions. An example of the custom canvas in PNG format is displayed in Figure 15. Examples of
the AmIUnique canvas, and of the Morellian canvas, are provided in Appendix A.8.
We observe that canvases are less distinctive in JPEG format than in PNG format, but are more
stable. For example, the custom canvas has a normalized entropy of 0.420 when exported in PNG,
against 0.399 for the JPEG version. However, the PNG version has a sameness rate of 92.16%, against
93.59% for the JPEG version. These differences are due to distinct images in PNG format ending
up the same after the lossy compression of the JPEG format. Acar et al. [1] assumes that a canvas
generated in a lossy compression format as JPEG is not an indicator of a fingerprinting attempt.
Although the JPEG version provides a lower distinctiveness than the PNG version, we show that
it is still highly distinctive when generated from a complex set of instructions. Indeed, it is the
second most distinctive attribute among ours (see Section 5.1.1). The time overhead induced by the
additional extraction in JPEG format is negligible. For example, the custom canvas has a median
collection time (MCT) increased by 3ms for the JPEG version, compared to the PNG version that
has a MCT of 266ms. We do not account the size differences as both formats are hashed, and the
resulting hashes weigh 64 bytes. The PNG and the JPEG versions are also highly correlated, as
knowing the value in the PNG format of the custom canvas leaves a normalized conditional entropy
(NCE) of 5.28 × 10−4 on the value of the JPEG format, whereas the inverse provides a NCE of 0.021.
The properties of the three PNG canvases differ, with the custom canvas being themost distinctive.
First, the Morellian canvas is an enhanced version of the AmIUnique canvas, with additional curves.
This enhancement provides an increase of the distinctiveness, with a normalized entropy of 0.385 for
the Morellian canvas against 0.353 for the AmIUnique canvas, but also a decrease of the sameness
rate, with a respective sameness rate of 94.71% against 98.64%. Then, the custom canvas is more
complex than the Morellian canvas, as it includes several emojis, two strings including Swedish
letters, many overlapping ellipses, a color gradient background, and a rotation of all these elements
if the functionality is available. These improvements provide a higher normalized entropy of 0.420,
but also a lower sameness rate of 92.16%. The main drawback of adding more complexity to the
custom canvas is the temporal cost, as it has a MCT of 266ms, against 37ms for the Morellian canvas,
and 32ms for the AmIUnique canvas. However, it represents less than 10% of the total median
collection time of the fingerprints, which is 2.92 seconds, and less than 5% of the median loading
time of a web page on a desktop browser [6], which is 6.5 seconds. Finally, knowing the value of
the custom canvas leaves less variability on the value of the two other canvases than the opposite.
When knowing the value of the Morellian canvas or of the AmIUnique canvas, the custom canvas
has a respective NCE of 0.079 and 0.103. However, knowing the value of the custom canvas, the
Morellian canvas has a NCE of 0.044, and the AmIUnique canvas has a NCE of 0.037. To conclude,
adding more instructions for the canvas drawing usually provides more distinctiveness, as each
instruction can induce a difference between browsers, at the cost of additional computation time.
17 Contrarily to the AmIUnique study [29], we only have one sentence and one smiling face emoji instead of two, we do not
draw a colored rectangle, and the sentence is drawn using a color gradient.
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Moreover, each additional instruction can constitute an instability factor, that negatively impacts
the sameness rate.
5.3.2 WebGL canvas. The WebGL canvas is an image that is also drawn using the HTML5 API, but
within the webgl or webgl2 contexts. These contexts use the WebGL library18 that leverages hard-
ware accelerations to render and manipulate two-dimensional graphics, but also three-dimensional
scenes. Canvas fingerprinting was first introduced by Mowery et al. [33] by using the webgl con-
text, but afterwards most studies focused on the 2d context [2, 7, 10, 48]. This can result from the
unreliability of the method encountered by Laperdrix et al. [29], for which Cao et al. [11] proposed
a remedy by setting specific parameters.
Our WebGL canvas consists into sequential triangles with a color gradient, and is simpler than
our designed HTML5 canvas. It provides a normalized entropy of 0.263 against 0.420 for the custom
HTML5 canvas, is more stable that the other canvases with a sameness rate of 98.97%, and has a
median collection time of 29ms against 266ms for the custom HTML5 canvas. Figure 16 displays an
example of our WebGL canvas.
5.3.3 Web Audio. Web Audio fingerprinting was discovered by Englehardt et al. [14] when assess-
ing the use of web tracking methods on the web, and more recently studied thoroughly by Queiroz
et al. [36]. It consists into processing audio data into the browser, and getting the rendered result.
Similarly to canvases, this processing relies on software and hardware components, and variations
occur between different component stacks. It works by creating an Audio Context, which in our
case is the OfflineAudioContext19, into which we manipulate Audio Nodes. The Audio Nodes
are of three types. Source nodes generate an audio signal (e.g., from a microphone or an audio
stream), destination nodes send the signal to be rendered (e.g., by speakers), and manipulation
nodes manipulate the signal (e.g., increasing the volume). These nodes are linked together to form
a network that goes from source nodes to destination nodes, and passes through manipulation
nodes. We refer the reader to [36] for a broader description of the main audio nodes.
We have three audio fingerprinting attributes. The audio fp simple (AFS) attribute relies on a
simple process. The attributes audio fp advanced (AFA) and audio fp advanced frequency data (AFA-
FD) rely on a more advanced process. Their concrete implementation is described in Appendix A.
The most distinctive audio attribute is the AFA-FD that has a normalized entropy of 0.161, followed
by the AFS (0.153), and the AFA (0.147). They all have a sameness rate of approximately 95%. Their
values are the string representations of floating-point numbers, hence they have a median size of
17 bytes. The simple process has a median collection time (MCT) of 1.4 seconds, and the advanced
process has a MCT of 1.7 seconds. The AFA-FD is collected from the advanced version, and has a
negligible 4ms additional MCT compared to the AFA.
6 RELATEDWORKS
In this section, we present related works about the use of browser fingerprinting for authentication.
In addition, Section 2.5 compares our dataset with the previously studied large-scale datasets [13,
19, 29, 35], and Section 5.1.1 compares the distinctiveness of our attributes with their distinctiveness
reported in previous studies [13, 19, 29].
We stress that most studies about browser fingerprinting focus on their use for identification.
The use of browser fingerprints for identification and for authentication differ in the objective
when given a presented fingerprint f . In identification, we seek to find the identity (e.g., an account,
18 https://get.webgl.org
19 The advantage of using OfflineAudioContext is the manipulation of audio signal without playing any sound on a real
audio output.
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an advertisement profile) to which f belongs, among a pool of N candidate identities. If f is
unrecognized, it is associated to a new identity that is then added to the candidate identities. Hence,
in identification we operate a 1-N comparison. On the contrary, in authentication the identity is
already given (e.g., the claimed account), and we seek to verify that f legitimately belongs to this
identity. Hence, in authentication we operate a 1-1 comparison20. The studies about the use of
browser fingerprints for identification usually evaluates the threat posed to privacy by browser
accessible information [13, 15, 19, 29, 33, 36, 44], propose counter-measures to avoid being tracked
by this technique [7, 27], or measure their usage in the wild [1, 14].
The first works about the use of browser fingerprinting for authentication focused on its use for
continuous authentication [34, 43, 47]. The objective is to verify that the authenticated session is not
hijacked. These studies focus on the integration of browser fingerprinting into an authentication
mechanism, and provide few insights about the properties of the fingerprints (e.g., only [43]
analyze fingerprints, and focus on their classification efficacy). On the contrary, we identify several
properties used to evaluate authentication factors, against which we evaluate real-life browser
fingerprints, and explain the results by highlighting the contribution of single attributes. Moreover,
these studies only consider a small fraction of the hundreds of available attributes, that do not
include the dynamic attributes that can be used in a challenge-response mechanism to thwart
replay attacks. We include more than 200 attributes – including 9 dynamic attributes – for which
we provide the implementation and the properties (e.g., number of distinct values, normalized
entropy).
Alaca et al. [4] provided a classification of the fingerprinting attributes, given properties that
include the stability, the distinctiveness, and the resource usage. They qualitatively estimate the
stability, the distinctiveness, and the resource usage of the attributes given their nature. For some
attributes, they provide the entropy measured in previous studies, and acknowledge that further
study is needed on this subject. We emphasize that comparing the entropy of the attributes between
datasets of different sizes leads to comparability problems as explained by [29] (e.g., the attribute of
a dataset of N fingerprints provides at most an entropy of log2(N ) bits). We provide the qualitative
measure of these properties on our attributes from the analysis of real-life fingerprints, and also
evaluate the accuracy of a simple verification mechanism. About the attributes considered by [4],
they include attributes that require interactions from the user, like the geolocation, or that are
related to the network protocol, like the TCP/IP stack fingerprinting that analyzes the response to
specially crafted messages. Moreover, their classification leads to different attributes being grouped
under a single designation, like the "major software and hardware details" that englobes the attribute
family of the JavaScript properties that we describe in Appendix A. The attributes of this family
can show diverse properties, like the UserAgent that provides a normalized entropy of 0.394 and a
sameness rate of 0.98%, whereas the screenX property of the window object provides a normalized
entropy of 0.125 and a sameness rate of 0.93%. We show that more than 200 attributes are easily
accessible (i.e., they require few lines of JavaScript), and do not require any interaction from the user,
which would reduce the usability (e.g., the user being asked permissions several times). Moreover,
we provide the exhaustive list of the attributes, with their concrete implementation and their
properties. We also evaluate the properties of distinctiveness, stability, and resource usage on the
complete fingerprints that combine as many attributes.
Markert et al. [32] recently presented a work in progress about the long-term analysis of fallback
authentication methods. They plan to measure the recovery rate of the evaluated methods, after an
20 If users register n browsers to their account, as described in Appendix C, f is compared to the fingerprint of these n
browsers that are already identified. Users are expected to register less than ten devices [39], hence n is expected to be
smaller than N (e.g., a website having a thousand accounts registered). It would also be possible to find the right fingerprint
among the n possibilities by leveraging the UserAgent to recognize which browser the user is using.
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elapsed time of 6, 12, and 18 months. These methods include the browser fingerprinting, for which
they acknowledge that “not much about browser fingerprinting-based security systems is known”.
Rochet et al. [38] and Laperdrix et al. [26] proposed challenge-response mechanisms that rely on
dynamic attributes, especially the HTML5 canvas. The instructions provided to the canvas API are
changed on each authentication, making the generated image vary on each fingerprinting. Trivial
replay attacks then fails as the awaited canvas image changes each time. In this study, we propose
the evaluation of nine dynamic attributes that include five HTML5 canvases, one WebGL canvas,
and three audio fingerprinting methods.
7 CONCLUSION
In this study, we conduct the first large-scale empirical study of the properties of browser fingerprints
when used for web authentication.Wemake the link between the digital fingerprints that distinguish
Humans, and the browser fingerprints that distinguish browsers, to evaluate the latter according to
properties inspired by biometric authentication factors. We formalize and evaluate the properties
for the browser fingerprints to be usable and practical in an authentication context. They include
the distinctiveness of the fingerprints, their stability, their collection time, their size, the loss of
efficacy among browser types, and the accuracy of a simple illustrative verification mechanism. We
evaluate these properties on a real-life large-scale fingerprint dataset collected over a period of
6 months, that contains 4, 145, 408 fingerprints composed of 216 attributes. The attributes include
nine dynamic attributes, which are used in state-of-the-art authentication mechanisms to mitigate
replay attacks. We thoroughly describe the preprocessing steps to prepare the dataset, and the
browser population that, contrary to most of previous studies, is not biased towards technically-
savvy users. About the results, we show that our browser fingerprints provide a unicity rate above
81.3%, considering our time-partitioned datasets. A rate that is stable over the 6 months. Moreover,
more than 94.7% of the fingerprints are shared by at most 8 browsers. However, we observe a loss
of distinctiveness from mobile browsers that show a lower unicity rate of 42%. About the stability,
and on average, more than 91% of the attributes are identical between two observations of the
fingerprint of a browser, even when they are separated by nearly 6 months. About the memory
and the time consumption of our fingerprints, we show that they weigh a dozen of kilobytes, and
take a few seconds to collect. Our simple verification mechanism achieves an equal error rate of
0.61%, thanks to most of the consecutive fingerprints of a browser having at least 234 identical
attributes, whereas most of the fingerprints of different browsers have fewer. To better comprehend
the results on the complete fingerprints, we evaluate the contribution of the attributes to each
fingerprint property. We show that, although the attributes show a lower distinctiveness compared
to previous studies, 10% of the attributes provide a normalized entropy higher than 0.25. Moreover,
four attributes unconsidered by the previous large-scale studies are part of the most distinctive of
our attributes. They concern the size and position of elements of the browser interface. About the
stability, 85% of the attributes stay identical between 99% of the pairs of consecutive fingerprints
coming from the same browser. Few attributes consume a high amount of resources, as only 33
attributes take more than 5ms to collect, and only 20 attributes weigh more than 100 bytes. When
looking at the correlation between the attributes, we find that 49 attributes can completely be
inferred when knowing the value of another attribute. We remark that the dynamic attributes are
part of the most time-consuming attributes, but also the most distinctive attributes. We also show
the importance of the set of instructions, as it influences both the distinctiveness and the stability of
the generated values (e.g., the canvas image). We conclude that the browser fingerprints, obtained
from the combination of the studied browser population and the large surface of fingerprinting
attributes, carry the promise to strengthen web authentication mechanisms.
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A BROWSER FINGERPRINTING ATTRIBUTES
In this section, we describe the 216 source attributes that are included in our script, and the
46 extracted attributes that are derived from source attributes.We group these attributes into families,
and provide references to related studies. Their name is sufficient to retrieve the corresponding
browser property, and when needed, we provide a brief description of the method for reproducibility.
We focus here on the description of the method, and provide a complete list of the attributes and
their property in Appendix E.
A.1 JavaScript properties
Most attributes are properties that are accessed through common JavaScript objects. The navigator
object provides information on the browser (e.g., version), its customization (e.g., language), the
underlying system (e.g. operating system), and supported functionalities (e.g., list of available
codecs). The screen object provides information on the screen size, the orientation, the pixel
density, and the available space for the web page. The window object provides information on the
window containing the web page, like its size or the support of storage mechanisms. The document
object gives access to the web page content, but also to a few properties. Such properties are already
included in previous studies [13, 19, 29] or open source projects21, but are usually limited to less
than 15 properties.
A.2 HTTP headers
We include 16 attributes that are collected from HTTP headers, most of which are already used in
previous studies [13, 19, 29]. Among these 16 attributes, 15 consist of the value of an explicitly
specified header, and the last attribute stores any remaining fields as pairs of name and value.
A.3 Enumeration or presence of browser components
One attribute family that provides a high diversity is the browser components that are installed in the
browser. The presence of some components can directly be accessed (e.g., the installed plugins 22),
21 https://github.com/Valve/fingerprintjs2
22 At the exception of the Firefox browsers that now only display the Flash plugin.
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whereas the presence of others have to be inferred (e.g., the installed fonts). The list of components
that are given in this section have the components separated by a comma.
A.3.1 List attributes. Previous studies already identified the list of plugins and the list of fonts as
highly distinctive [13, 29], hence we include these two attributes in our fingerprinting script. We
enumerate the list of plugins, and check the size of text boxes [15] to infer the presence of 66 fonts.
Additionally, we get the list of mime types (i.e., the supported data format), and the list of speech
synthesis voices.
A.3.2 Support of video, audio, and streaming codecs. We infer the support of video codecs by creating
a video element and checking if it can play a given type using the canPlayType() function. The
support of audio codecs is done using the same method, but for an audio element. We infer the
support of streaming codecs by calling the isTypeSupported() function of the window.[WebKit,
moz, ms, ]MediaSource object, using both the audio codecs and the video codecs for which we
check the presence. We apply the same method to infer the support of recording codecs, but on the
MediaRecorder object instead.
A.3.3 List of video codecs. The 15 video codecs for which we infer the presence are the following:
video/mp2t; codecs="avc1.42E01E,mp4a.40.2", video/mp4; codecs="avc1.42c00d", video/mp4; codecs-
="avc1.4D401E", video/mp4; codecs="mp4v.20.8", video/mp4; codecs="avc1.42E01E", video/mp4;
codecs="avc1.42E01E, mp4a.40.2", video/mp4; codecs="hvc1.1.L0.0", video/mp4; codecs="hev1.1.L0.-
0", video/ogg; codecs="theora", video/ogg; codecs="vorbis", video/webm; codecs="vp8", video/webm;
codecs="vp9", application/dash+xml, application/vnd.apple.mpegURL, audio/mpegurl.
A.3.4 List of audio codecs. The 9 audio codecs for which we infer the presence are the following:
audio/wav; codecs="1", audio/mpeg, audio/mp4; codecs="mp4a.40.2", audio/mp4; codecs="ac-3",
audio/mp4; codecs="ec-3", audio/ogg; codecs="vorbis", audio/ogg; codecs="opus", audio/webm;
codecs="vorbis", audio/webm; codecs="opus".
A.3.5 List of detected fonts. The 66 fonts for which we infer the presence are the following: Andale
Mono; AppleGothic; Arial; Arial Black; Arial Hebrew; Arial MT; Arial Narrow; Arial Rounded MT
Bold; Arial Unicode MS; Bitstream Vera Sans Mono; Book Antiqua; Bookman Old Style; Calibri;
Cambria; Cambria Math; Century; Century Gothic; Century Schoolbook; Comic Sans; Comic Sans
MS; Consolas; Courier; Courier New; Garamond; Geneva; Georgia; Helvetica; Helvetica Neue;
Impact; Lucida Bright; Lucida Calligraphy; Lucida Console; Lucida Fax; LUCIDA GRANDE; Lucida
Handwriting; Lucida Sans; Lucida Sans Typewriter; Lucida Sans Unicode; Microsoft Sans Serif;
Monaco; Monotype Corsiva; MS Gothic; MS Outlook; MS PGothic; MS Reference Sans Serif; MS
Sans Serif; MS Serif; MYRIAD; MYRIAD PRO; Palatino; Palatino Linotype; Segoe Print; Segoe Script;
Segoe UI; Segoe UI Light; Segoe UI Semibold; Segoe UI Symbol; Tahoma; Times; Times New Roman;
Times New Roman PS; Trebuchet MS; Verdana; Wingdings; Wingdings 2; Wingdings 3.
A.4 Extension detection
The installed browser extensions cannot be directly accessed, but their presence can be inferred by
changes brought to the page content by the extension [44], or by the presence of web accessible
resources [23, 41]. We check the changes that can be brought to the page content by 8 extensions
that are listed in Table 4, and the availability of the web accessible resources of 8 extensions that
are listed in Table 5.
A.4.1 Detection of an ad blocker. We also infer the presence of an advertisement blocker by creating
an invisible dummy advertisement, and by checking if it is removed or not. The dummy advertise-
ment is a created division with the id property set to ad_ads_pub_track, the class property set
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Table 4. Extensions detected by the changes they bring to the page content.
Extension Page content change
Privowny W.privownyAddedListener[EXT] is supported
UBlock D.head has display: none !important; and :root as style
Pinterest D.body.data-pinterest-extension-installed is supported
Grammarly D.body.data-gr-c-s-loaded is supported
Adguard W.AG_onLoad is supported
Evernote Element with style-1-cropbar-clipper as id exists
TOTL W.ytCinema is supported
IE Tab W.ietab.getVersion() is supported
Table 5. Extensions detected by the availability of their web accessible resource. C stands for chrome, and R
stands for resource.
Extension Web accessible resource
Firebug C://firebug/skin/firebugBig.png
YahooToolbar R://635abd67-4fe9-1b23-4f01-e679fa7484c1/icon.png
EasyScreenshot C://easyscreenshot/skin/icon16.png
Ghostery R://firefox-at-ghostery-dot-com/data/images/ghosty-16px.png
Kaspersky R://urla-at-kaspersky-dot-com/data/icon-16.png
VideoDownloadHelper R://b9db16a4-6edc-47ec-a1f4-b86292ed211d/data/images/icon-18.png
GTranslate R://aff87fa2-a58e-4edd-b852-0a20203c1e17/icon.png
Privowny C://privowny/content/icons/privowny_extension_logo.png
to ads .html?ad= /?view=ad text-ad textAd text_ad text_ads text-ads, and the style
property set to width: 1px !important; height: 1px !important; position: absolute
!important; left: -1000px !important; top: -1000px !important;.
A.5 Size and color of web page elements
A.5.1 Bounding boxes. The attributes related to the bounding boxes concern a div element to which
we append a span element. The div element has his style property set to the values displayed
in Table 5. The span element contains a specifically crafted text that is provided below. The size
of the bounding boxes (i.e., the width and the height of the rectangles of the div and the span
elements) are then collected using the getClientRects function. The text of the span element
is \ua9c0 \u2603 \u20B9 \u2604 \u269b \u2624 \u23B7 \u262c \u2651 \u269d \u0601
\u0603 \uaac1 \u060e \u06dd \ud83c\udfe1 mmmmmmmmmmlil \u102a. The characters that
start with a \u are special Unicode characters (e.g., emoji, letter of a non-latin alphabet).
A.5.2 Width and position of a created div. The attribute named width and position of a created div
is the properties of width and transform-origin of a newly created div element, obtained by
calling the getComputedStyle function. This created div element is afterward used to infer the
color of layout components, as described below.
A.5.3 Colors of layout components. The attribute colors of layout components is obtained by ap-
plying the color of several layout components (e.g., the scroll bar) to the created div element, and
by getting the color back from the property W.getComputedStyle(new_div).color. Each of the
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Table 6. Properties of the div element measured for the attributes related to the bounding boxes.
Property Value
position absolute
left -9999px
textAlign center
objectFit scale-down
font 68px / 83px Helvetica, Arial, Sans-serif
zoom 66%
MozTransform scale(0.66)
visibility hidden
tested component gets its color extracted this way, and aggregated in this attribute. The color
of each element is afterward extracted as a single attribute. They are displayed at the end of the
Table 13.
A.6 WebGL properties
Our script collects several properties from the WebGL API. To obtain them, we create a canvas
element and get its WebGL context by calling getContext() with any of the following parameters:
webgl, webgl2, moz-webgl, experimental-webgl, or experimental-webgl2.
The property MAX_TEXTURE_MAX_ANISOTROPY_EXT is obtained from one of [WEBKIT_EXT_, MOZ-
_EXT_, EXT_]texture_filter_anisotropic. To get the UNMASKED attributes, we first get an
identifier named id from the unmasked property of the getExtension(’WEBGL_debug_rende-
rer_info’) object, and then get the actual value by calling getParameter(id). Finally, to get
the COMPRESSED_TEXTURE_FORMATS property, we have to load the [WEBKIT_]WEBGL_compressed-
_texture_s3tc extension first.
A.7 WebRTC fingerprinting
We include a WebRTC fingerprinting method similar to the method proposed by Takasu et al. [45].
The method consists into getting information about the Session Description Protocol of a generated
WebRTC connection. Due to the variability of this information, we create two different connections
and hold only the values that are identical between these two. As this method leaks internal IP
addresses, we hash them directly on the client.
A.8 HTML5 canvases inspired by previous studies
We dedicate the Section 5.3 to a focus on dynamic attributes, and provide here examples of the
two HTML5 canvases that are inspired by previous studies. Our script includes a canvas inspired
by the AmIUnique study [29] in both PNG and JPEG formats (example given at Figure 17), and
an enhanced version of it similar to the Morellian study [26] in PNG format (example given at
Figure 18).
A.9 Audio fingerprinting
We dedicate the Section 5.3 to a focus on dynamic attributes, and provide here the concrete imple-
mentation together with the network of AudioNode objects used within each audio fingerprinting
methods. These methods are inspired by the methods described by Englehardt et al. [14], and
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Fig. 17. HTML5 canvas inspired by the AmIU-
nique [29] study in PNG format.
Fig. 18. HTML5 canvas similar to the Morellian [26]
study in PNG format.
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Fig. 19. Architecture of the network of AudioNode objects for the simple audio fingerprinting method.
are designed to form complex networks of AudioNode objects to have more chances to induce
fingerprintable behaviors.
A.9.1 Simple audio fingerprinting method. The simple process consists of three OscillatorNode
objects that generate a periodic wave, connected to a single DynamicsCompressorNode, and fin-
ishing to a AudioDestinationNode. The architecture of the network of AudioNode objects for
the simple process is depicted in Figure 19, together with the parameters set for each node. The
OscillatorNode objects are started one after the other, and overlap at some time. The sequence of
events is the following: (1) the triangle oscillator node is started at t = 0 seconds, (2) the square os-
cillator is started at t = 0.10 seconds, (3) the triangle oscillator is stopped t = 0.20 seconds, together
with the start of the sine oscillator node, (4) the square oscillator is stopped at t = 0.25 seconds.
When the rendering of the audio context is done, the complete event is triggered, and gives access
to a renderedBuffer that contains the audio data encoded as a buffer of 32 bits floating-point
numbers. The audio fp simple (AFS) attribute is an integer computed as the sum of the values of the
renderedBuffer, that are first casted to absolute integers.
A.9.2 Advanced audio fingerprinting method. The advanced process consists of four Oscillator-
Node objects, two BiquadFilterNode objects, two PannerNode objects, one DynamicsCompressor-
Node, one AnalyserNode, and one AudioDestinationNode. The architecture of the networks of
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article . Publication date: June 2020.
38 Nampoina Andriamilanto, Tristan Allard, Gaëtan Le Guelvouit, and Alexandre Garel
Oscillator
Node
type = triangle
frequency = 250
Oscillator
Node
type = square
frequency = 210
Oscillator
Node
type = sine
frequency = 170
Dynamics
Compressor
Node
threshold = -60
knee = 10
ratio =10
reduction = -20
attack = 0
release = 0.25
Destination
Node
OfflineAudioContext
Oscillator
Node
type = sine
frequency = 280
Biquad
Filter
Node
type = notch
frequency = 210
Q = 10
Biquad
Filter
Node
type = highpass
frequency = 210
Q = 100
Panner
Node
position = (23, 17, -5)
Panner
Node
position = (-36, 28, 31)
Analyser
Node
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AudioNode objects for the simple process is depicted in Figure 20, together with the parameters
set for each node. The OscillatorNode objects are started one after the other, and overlap at
some time. The sequence of events is the following: (1) the triangle oscillator node and the sine
oscillator node with a frequency of 280 are started at t = 0 seconds, (2) the square oscillator is started
at t = 0.05 seconds, (3) the triangle oscillator is stopped t = 0.10 seconds, (4) the sine oscillator
with a frequency of 170 is stopped at t = 0.15 seconds, (5) the square oscillator is stopped at
t = 0.20 seconds. When the rendering of the audio context is done, the complete event is triggered,
and gives access to a renderedBuffer that contains the audio data encoded as a buffer of 32 bits
floating-point numbers. The audio fp advanced (AFA) attribute is an integer computed as the
sum of the values of the renderedBuffer, that are first casted to absolute integers. The audio fp
advanced frequency data (AFA-FD) attribute is the sum of the frequency data obtained through the
getFloatFrequencyData function of the Analyser Node.
B KEYWORDS
In this section, we provide the keywords used to infer the browser family, the operating system,
and if the browser is a robot (i.e., if it is an automatized tool, hence is not a genuine visitor). We
match these keywords on the UserAgent JavaScript property, that is first set to lower case. We
manually compiled the keywords, by searching for meaningful keywords. Afterward, we classify
the UserAgents given these keywords, and searched for additional keywords in the unclassified
UserAgents that remain. This process was repeated until every UserAgent was classified. This
process leads to a huge variety of finely-grained keywords, hence we only provide here the keywords
that are meaningful for this study.
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Table 7. The keywords and the exact UserAgent values that we consider as indicating a robot browser. Long
values are cut at a blank space and displayed with indentations.
Blacklisted keyword Blacklisted value
googlebot mozilla/4.0 (compatible; msie 7.0; windows nt 6.1; trident/7.0; slcc2;
evaliant .net clr 2.0.50727; .net clr 3.5.30729; .net clr 3.0.30729;
bot.html media center pc 6.0; .net4.0c; .net4.0e)
voilabot mozilla/5.0 (x11; linux x86_64) applewebkit/537.36 (khtml, like gecko)
google web preview chrome/52.0.2743.116 safari/537.36
spider mozilla/5.0 (windows nt 6.3; rv:36.0) gecko/20100101 firefox/36.0
bingpreview mozilla/5.0 (macintosh; intel mac os x 10.10; rv:38.0) gecko/20100101
firefox/38.0
B.1 Robot keywords
We check that the UserAgent HTTP header does not contain the keywords, nor is set to the exact
values, that are listed in Table 7.
B.2 Device type
To infer the device type of a browser, we match keywords sequentially with the UserAgent of
the browser. The set of keywords can overlap between two device types (e.g., the UserAgent of
tablet browsers often contain keywords of mobile browsers, like mobile for example). Due to
this overlapping problem, we verify that the UserAgent of the browser contains the keyword of
the device type, and does not contain the keyword of some other device types. Table 8 lists the
keywords that we leverage to infer each device type.
The mobile devices are smartphones, and do not include tablets. We assert that their UserAgent
contain a mobile keyword, and no tablet nor miscellaneous keyword. To infer that a device is a
tablet, we assert that their UserAgent contain a tablet keyword, and no miscellaneous keyword.
The miscellaneous devices are game consoles and smart TVs. We assert that their UserAgent contain
a miscellaneous keyword. Finally, to infer that a device is a desktop computer, we assert that
their UserAgent does not contain any of the mobile, tablet, or miscellaneous keyword. In the
table, we omit a miscellaneous keyword due to its size, which is: opera/9.80 (linux i686; u; fr)
presto/2.10.287 version/12.00 ; sc/ihd92 stb.
B.3 Browser and operating system families
Table 9 lists the keywords that we leverage to infer the family of a browser, and Table 10 lists the
keywords that we leverage to infer the operating system family of a browser. As a keyword can
be in the UserAgent of two different families, we verify the keywords sequentially in the order
presented in the tables, and classify a device in the first family having a keyword that matches.
C BROWSER FINGERPRINTING-BASED AUTHENTICATION MECHANISM
Browser fingerprinting can enhance an authentication mechanism by providing an additional
barrier at a low usability and deployability cost. In this section, we provide an example of how it can
concretely be implemented. The verifier controls a web platform on which users have a registered
account. Each registered account is associated to an identifier, and to a set of authentication
factors. The authentication factors include the fingerprints of each registered browser for a user.
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Table 8. The keywords that we consider as indicating
each device type.
Mobile Tablet Miscellaneous
phone ipad wii
mobile tablet playstation
android terra pad smart-tv
iphone tab smarttv
blackberry googletv
wpdesktop opera tv
appletv
nintendo
xbox
Table 9. The keywords that we consider as indicating
each browser family.
Browser Family Keywords
Firefox Firefox
Internet Explorer MSIE, Trident/7.0
Chrome Chrome, Chromium
Table 10. The keywords that we consider as indicating each operating system family.
Operating System Family Keywords
Windows 10 Windows NT 10.0
Windows 7 Windows NT 6.1
Other Windows Windows NT, Windows 7, Windows 98, Windows 95,
Windows CE
Mac OS Mac OS X (but not iPad, nor iPhone)
Linux-based Linux, CrOS, NetBSD, FreeBSD, OpenBSD, Fedora, Ubuntu,
Mint
Android Android
Windows Phone Windows Phone
iOS iPad, iPhone (but not Mac OS X)
We emphasize that dynamic attributes can be integrated to the browser fingerprints to enforce a
challenge-response mechanism that mitigates replay attacks [26, 38].
Enrollment. The enrollment consists for a user to create his account and link the several authenti-
cation factors that he uses. During this step, the user and the verifier agrees on the account identifier
(e.g., username, email address, phone number) and on the authentication factors (e.g., password,
email address, phone number) that are assigned to the user. The fingerprint of the browser in use by
the user during the enrollment is collected and stored as the first browser fingerprint of the user. To
register an additional browser, the user is required to authenticate using other strong factors (e.g.,
a physical token, one time passwords), before getting the fingerprint of this new browser stored.
Authentication. During each authentication, the user claims an account by providing the identifier
and by presenting the used authentication factors. The verifier compares the presented authenti-
cation factors with the ones stored for this user, and if they match the user is deemed legitimate
and is given access to the account. Otherwise, the user is denied access, and the verifier can take
preventive actions [18] according to her policy (e.g., blocking the account). The verifier notably
compares the collected browser fingerprint with the fingerprints of the browsers registered to the
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account. If the other factors match, and the fingerprint of one of the registered browser matches the
collected fingerprint, the fingerprint stored for this browser is updated to the newly collected one.
Account Recovery. It happens that legitimate users are not able to provide the authentication
factors (e.g., a password is forgotten, a physical token is lost). When it occurs, users are given
access to an account recovery mechanism [32] that leverages other authentication factors than the
usual ones (e.g., face-to-face verification, email verification). Users cannot mistake their browser
fingerprint, but it can become hard to recognize if too many changes are brought to the web
environment into which the browser is running. In this case, the user is asked to undergo the
account recovery step, and to select the registered browser for which to update its fingerprint.
D ADVANCED VERIFICATION MECHANISM
Section 3.3.4 describes a simple verification mechanism that simply checks that the number of
identical attributes between the presented fingerprint and the one stored is below a threshold.
In this section, we present the results obtained using an advanced verification mechanism that
incorporates matching functions that authorize limited changes between the attribute values of the
two fingerprints. The methodology to obtain the datasets is the same as described in Section 4.3.3.
D.1 Attributes matching
The advanced verification mechanism leverages matching functions for the comparison between
attributes. It counts the attributes that match between the two compared fingerprints, given the
matching functions, and considers the evolution legitimate if this number is above a threshold.
More formally, we seek to compare the stored fingerprint f to the presented fingerprint д. To
do so, we compare the values f [a] and д[a] of the attribute a for the fingerprints f and д, using
the matching function ≈a . The matching function ≈a of the attribute a verifies that the distance
between f [a] and д[a] are below a threshold θa . Finally, we deem that д is a legitimate evolution of
f , if the total number of matching attributes between f and д is above a threshold Θ.
Similarly to previous studies [13, 22, 48], we consider a distance measure that depends on the
type of the attribute. The Damerau-Levenshtein distance [21] is used for the textual attributes, the
Jaccard distance [51] is used for the set attributes, the absolute difference is used for the numerical
attributes, and the identity function is used for the categorical attributes. The distance thresholds of
each attribute is obtained by training a Support Vector Machines [20] model on the two classes of
each month sample, and extract the threshold from the resulting hyperplane. At the exception of
the dynamic attributes, that are required to be identical (i.e., the distance threshold is null) as they
would contribute to a challenge-response mechanism [26, 38].
D.2 Distribution of matching attributes
Figure 21 displays the distribution of the matching attributes between the same-browser compar-
isons and the different-browsers comparisons, starting from 51 matching attributes as there are no
observed value below. Figure 22 presents a focus that starts from 214 matching attributes, below
which there are less than 0.001 of the same-browser comparisons. We can observe that the two
classes are well separated, as 99% of the same-browser comparisons have at least 235 identical
attributes, and 99% of the different-browsers comparisons are below. The different-browsers compar-
isons have generally fewer and more spread number of matching attributes than the same-browser
comparisons. The different-browsers comparisons have between 51 and 253 matching attributes,
with an average of 134.59 attributes, and a standard deviation of 43.25 attributes. The same-browser
comparisons have between 81 and 253 matching attributes, with an average of 249.45 attributes,
and a standard deviation of 3.69 attributes.
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Fig. 21. The number of matching attributes between
the same-browser comparisons and the different-
browsers comparisons.
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Fig. 23. False match rate (FMR) and false non-match rate (FNMR) given the required number of matching
attributes, averaged among the six samples.
D.3 Distribution of match rates
Figure 23 displays the false match rate (FMR), which is the proportion of the same-browser compar-
isons that are classified as different-browsers comparisons, and the false non-match rate (FNMR),
which is the inverse. The displayed results are the average for each number of matching attributes
among the six samples. As there are no same-browser comparisons that have less than 235matching
attributes, the FNMR is null until this value. However, after exceeding this threshold, the FNMR
increases as same-browser comparisons begin to be classified as different-browsers comparisons.
The equal error rate, which is the rate where both the FMR and the FNMR are equal, is of 0.66%
and is achieved for 234 matching attributes.
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Table 11. Comparison between the simple verification mechanism using identical attributes and the advanced
verification mechanism using matching attributes.
Result Simple Advanced
Same-browser: range of identical or matching attributes [72; 252] [81; 253]
Same-browser: average identical or matching attributes 248.64 249.45
Same-browser: standard deviation 3.91 3.69
Different-browsers: range of identical or matching attributes [34; 253] [51; 253]
Different-browsers: average identical or matching attributes 127.41 134.59
Different-browsers: standard deviation 44.06 43.25
Equal error rate (EER) 0.62% 0.67%
Threshold of identical or matching attributes 231 233
D.4 Comparison with identical matching
The matching functions of the advanced verification mechanism leads to more attributes that
match than attributes that are identical between two fingerprints. The higher number of match-
ing attributes happens for the same-browser comparisons, but also for the different-browsers
comparisons. This reduces the False Non-Match Rate (FNMR), but also increases the False-Match
Rate (FMR). Due to the FMR being higher, the equal error rate is slightly higher for the advanced
verification mechanism that leverages matching functions.
Table 11 compares the results of the simple verification mechanism that leverages the identi-
cal attributes, and the advanced verification mechanism that leverages the matching attributes.
Considering the matching functions only increase the average number of matching attributes for
the same-browser comparisons by 0.81, whereas this increase is greater for the different-browsers
comparisons at 7.18. The matching functions seem to contribute more to falsely linking different-
browsers comparisons than same-browser comparisons. Due to this, the equal error rate is slightly
higher for the advanced verification mechanism than for the simple one, respectively at 0.67%
against 0.61%. Finally, we remark that the range of the identical attributes for the same-browser
comparisons only goes up to 252 attributes. This is explained by our deduplication step during the
preprocessing of the dataset (see Section 2.4.3) that removes the consecutive fingerprints that are
identical, hence they are forcibly different. As for the different-browsers comparisons, it always
goes up to 253 attributes, as coincidence can make fingerprints of different browsers match.
E ATTRIBUTES LIST AND PROPERTY
In this section, we provide the complete list of our fingerprinting attributes, together with their
property.
E.1 Properties distribution
In this section, we discuss the distribution of the properties of our 262 attributes that are displayed
in Table 13. We focus here on the distribution of the number of distinct values, and refer the reader
to Section 5 for the distribution of the other properties of the attributes, namely: the normalized
entropy, the minimum normalized conditional entropy, the sameness rate, the median collection
time, and the median size. Table 12 provides the minimum, the average, the maximum, and the
standard deviation of these properties among the attributes.
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Table 12. The minimum, the average, the maximum, and the standard deviation (Std. dev.) of the distinct
values, of the normalized entropy, of the minimum normalized conditional entropy, of the median collection
time in seconds, of the median size in bytes, and of the sameness rate of the attributes.
Property Minimum Average Maximum Std. dev.
Distinct values 1 7,633 671,254 51,298
Normalized entropy 0.000 0.090 0.420 0.094
Minimum normalized conditional entropy 0.000 0.008 0.181 0.021
Sameness rate 0.470 0.982 1.000 0.069
Median collection time (seconds) 0.008 0.811 2.184 0.932
Median size (bytes) 1 23.51 502 60.84
E.1.1 Distribution of distinct values. Figure 24 depicts the cumulative distribution of the distinct
values among the attribute. The distinct values presents high variations, as can be seen by the
standard deviation of 51, 298. We have 42% of the attributes that have 10 distinct values or less,
63% that have 100 distinct values or less, and 79% that have 1, 000 distinct values or less. Only
5 attributes have more than 100, 000 distinct values, which are the WebRTC fingerprinting method
(671, 254 values), the list of plugins (314, 518 values), the custom canvas in the PNG format (269, 874
values) and in the JPEG format (205, 005 values), together with the list of mime types (174, 876
values).
The values of the attributes are of different nature, impacting the distinct values that can be
observed among different population or time ranges. Some attributes have a fixed number of
values, like the Boolean attributes or the categorical attributes that have a fixed set of possibilities.
Other attributes are composed of elements having a fixed set of possibilities, but their combination
provides a high number of values. It is the case for the attributes that are related to languages
that typically are a combination of language identifiers (e.g., fr), that can be valued (e.g., q = 0.80).
These attributes also comprise the list of fonts, that is composed of Boolean values that indicates
the presence of a given font. Other attributes consists into an integer or a real number represented
as a floating-point number, resulting in a large set of possible values. This category comprises
any size related attribute (e.g., the screen width and height), or our audio fingerprinting method
which results are floating-point numbers with a high precision of more than 8 digits. Finally, some
attributes are textual information that can include version number, which also results in a high
number of distinct values. Moreover, as new values appear through time (e.g., new versions, new
software component), the set of the observed values is expected to grow over the observations.
Examples are the UserAgent or the list of plugins, as these attributes are typically composed of the
name and the version of several hardware and software components.
E.2 Attributes list
Table 13 lists our attributes, together with their number of distinct values seen during the experiment
(Values), their normalized entropy (N. Ent.), their sameness rate (% Same), their median size (Size),
and their median collection time (Time).
E.2.1 Attributes nomenclature. To stay concise, we replace the name of common JavaScript objects
or of API calls by abbreviations. We denote D the JavaScript document object, M the Math object,
N the navigator object, S the screen object, andW the window object. Additionally, we denote
A an initialized Audio Context, AA an initialized Audio Analyser, and AD the A.destination
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Fig. 24. Cumulative distribution of the number of distinct values of the attributes, in logarithmic scale.
property. Finally, we denote WG an initialized WebGL Context, WM the WG.MAX_ prefix, and WI
the WG.IMPLEMENTATION_ prefix.
Due to the diversity of JavaScript engines, some properties are accessible through different
names, regularly prefixed by moz for Firefox or ms for Internet Explorer. We use square brackets to
easily denote these cases, and consider that A.[B, C] means that the property is accessed through
A.B or A.C. If there is only one element inside these brackets, this one is optional. We denote [...]
a part that is omitted but described in the corresponding attribute family description.
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Table 13. Browser fingerprinting attributes, together with their distinct values, their normalized entropy,
their minimum normalized conditional entropy (MNCE), their stability, their median size, and their median
collection time. The attributes from which we derive the extracted ones are ignored for the MNCE.
Attribute Values N. Ent. MNCE % Same Size Time
N.userAgent 38,863 0.394 0.046 0.978 115 0.000
Listing of N 1,660 0.207 0.009 0.989 502 0.001
Listing of screen 82 0.129 0.000 0.999 209 0.000
N.language 228 0.066 0.006 0.999 2 0.000
N.languages 1,448 0.094 0.010 0.998 17 0.000
N.userLanguage 124 0.036 0.001 1.000 1 0.000
N.systemLanguage 115 0.037 0.001 1.000 1 0.000
N.browserLanguage 52 0.036 0.000 1.000 1 0.000
N.platform 32 0.068 0.000 1.000 5 0.000
N.appName 5 0.003 0.000 1.000 8 0.000
N.appVersion 37,310 0.342 0.000 0.984 107 0.000
N.appMinorVersion 10 0.035 0.000 1.000 1 0.000
N.product 2 0.003 0.000 1.000 5 0.000
N.productSub 10 0.067 0.000 1.000 8 0.000
N.vendor 21 0.064 0.000 1.000 1 0.000
N.vendorSub 2 0.035 0.000 1.000 1 0.000
N.cookieEnabled 1 0.000 0.000 1.000 4 0.000
N.cpuClass 6 0.039 0.000 1.000 1 0.000
N.oscpu 60 0.071 0.000 1.000 1 0.000
N.hardwareConcurrency 28 0.086 0.025 0.999 1 0.000
N.buildID 1,351 0.076 0.010 0.989 1 0.000
[N.security, D.security[Policy]] 30 0.038 0.001 1.000 7 0.000
N.permissions 3 0.045 0.000 1.000 1 0.000
W.Notification.permission 5 0.043 0.001 0.999 7 0.000
W.Notification.maxActions 3 0.041 0.000 1.000 1 0.000
N.[msM, m]axTouchPoints 42 0.098 0.004 0.999 3 0.000
D.createEvent("TouchEvent") support 3 0.032 0.000 1.000 1 0.000
W.ontouchstart support 3 0.032 0.000 1.000 1 0.000
N.javaEnabled() 4 0.045 0.008 0.997 1 0.000
N.taintEnabled() 3 0.045 0.000 1.000 1 0.000
[[N, W].doNotTrack, N.msDoNotTrack] 11 0.085 0.012 1.000 6 0.000
N.connection support 3 0.022 0.000 1.000 1 0.000
N.connection.type 12 0.028 0.003 0.992 1 0.000
N.connection.downlink 91 0.032 0.003 0.995 1 0.000
N.[mozC, c]onnection.bandwidth 6 0.023 0.000 1.000 3 0.000
N.mediaDevices support 3 0.044 0.000 0.999 1 0.000
N.mediaDevices.getSupportedConstraints() 12 0.090 0.000 0.997 144 0.000
W.Intl.Collator().resolvedOptions() 311 0.096 0.000 0.999 115 0.005
W.Intl.DateTimeFormat().resolvedOptions() 1,849 0.154 0.011 0.996 111 0.003
W.Intl.NumberFormat().resolvedOptions() 260 0.070 0.000 0.999 138 0.001
W.Intl.v8BreakIterator().resolvedOptions() 75 0.046 0.000 0.999 1 0.000
N.getGamepads() 18 0.090 0.000 0.998 1 0.001
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article . Publication date: June 2020.
A Large-scale Empirical Analysis of Browser Fingerprints Properties for Web Authentication 47
Attribute Values N. Ent. MNCE % Same Size Time
W.InstallTrigger.enabled() 4 0.037 0.000 1.000 1 0.000
W.InstallTrigger.updateEnabled() 4 0.037 0.000 1.000 1 0.000
N.msManipulationViewsEnabled 5 0.052 0.000 1.000 3 0.000
N.[msP, p]ointerEnabled 9 0.051 0.000 1.000 3 0.000
D.msCapsLockWarningOff 3 0.039 0.000 1.000 1 0.000
D.msCSSOMElementFloatMetrics 4 0.039 0.000 1.000 1 0.000
N.[msW, w]ebdriver 6 0.048 0.001 1.000 3 0.000
W.Debug.debuggerEnabled 5 0.042 0.000 0.989 1 0.000
W.Debug.setNonUserCodeExceptions 4 0.042 0.000 0.989 1 0.000
new Date(2016, 1, 1).getTimezoneOffset() 60 0.008 0.001 0.999 2 0.000
Different Timezone at 01/01 and 06/01 3 0.005 0.002 0.999 1 0.000
S.width 1,280 0.192 0.005 0.987 4 0.000
S.height 1,016 0.188 0.015 0.987 3 0.000
W.screenX 3,071 0.125 0.047 0.925 1 0.000
W.screenY 1,181 0.126 0.049 0.925 1 0.000
S.availWidth 1,746 0.202 0.016 0.985 4 0.000
S.availHeight 1,353 0.268 0.058 0.984 3 0.000
S.availTop 460 0.060 0.003 1.000 1 0.000
S.availLeft 372 0.048 0.005 0.999 1 0.000
S.(pixelDepth, colorDepth) 14 0.031 0.001 1.000 5 0.000
S.deviceXDPI 249 0.073 0.000 0.993 1 0.000
S.deviceYDPI 249 0.073 0.000 0.993 1 0.000
S.systemXDPI 75 0.053 0.000 0.999 1 0.000
S.systemYDPI 75 0.053 0.000 0.999 1 0.000
S.logicalXDPI 6 0.039 0.000 1.000 1 0.000
S.logicalYDPI 6 0.039 0.000 1.000 1 0.000
W.innerWidth 2,572 0.263 0.023 0.957 4 0.000
W.innerHeight 2,297 0.388 0.181 0.906 3 0.000
W.outerWidth 2,481 0.293 0.074 0.909 4 0.000
W.outerHeight 4,046 0.327 0.117 0.872 3 0.000
W.devicePixelRatio 2,035 0.103 0.026 0.992 1 0.000
W.mozInnerScreenX 3,682 0.065 0.011 0.991 1 0.000
W.mozInnerScreenY 3,170 0.102 0.020 0.991 1 0.000
W.offscreenBuffering 4 0.067 0.000 1.000 4 0.000
S.orientation 3 0.044 0.000 1.000 1 0.000
S.[orientation.type, [moz, ms]Orientation] 26 0.107 0.003 0.994 21 0.000
S.orientation.angle 7 0.050 0.002 0.996 1 0.000
W.localStorage support 4 0.001 0.001 1.000 1 0.001
W.sessionStorage support 4 0.000 0.000 1.000 1 0.000
W.indexedDB support 3 0.002 0.000 1.000 1 0.000
W.openDatabase support 3 0.045 0.000 1.000 1 0.000
W.caches support 3 0.045 0.000 1.000 1 0.000
M.tan(-1e300) 15 0.087 0.002 1.000 19 0.000
M.tan(3.14159265359 * 0.3333 * 1e300) 12 0.085 0.000 0.999 18 0.000
M.acos(0.000000000000001) 4 0.058 0.000 1.000 18 0.000
M.acosh(1.000000000001) 7 0.071 0.000 1.000 24 0.000
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M.asinh(0.00001) 6 0.071 0.000 1.000 23 0.000
M.asinh(1e300) 6 0.058 0.000 1.000 17 0.000
M.atan(2) 3 0.018 0.000 1.000 18 0.000
M.atan2(0.01, 1000) 3 0.045 0.000 1.000 23 0.000
M.atanh(0.0001) 5 0.070 0.000 1.000 22 0.000
M.cosh(15) 8 0.058 0.000 1.000 18 0.000
M.exp(-1e2) 8 0.028 0.000 1.000 21 0.000
M.exp(1e2) 9 0.028 0.000 1.000 22 0.000
M.LOG2E 3 0.039 0.000 1.000 18 0.000
M.LOG10E 3 0.000 0.000 1.000 18 0.000
M.E 2 0.000 0.000 1.000 17 0.000
M.LN10 3 0.000 0.000 1.000 17 0.000
D.defaultCharset 71 0.075 0.001 0.999 1 0.000
Width and height of fallback font text 2,347 0.199 nan 0.998 11 0.100
W.[performance, console].jsHeapSizeLimit 24 0.083 0.002 0.991 3 0.000
W.menubar.visible 5 0.035 0.000 1.000 4 0.000
W.isSecureContext 4 0.045 0.000 0.999 5 0.000
S.fontSmoothingEnabled 4 0.042 0.001 1.000 1 0.000
new Date(0) 1,846 0.118 0.004 0.998 82 0.004
new Date("0001-1-1") 2,107 0.150 0.010 0.999 60 0.002
new Date(0) then setFullYear(0) 2,376 0.136 0.013 0.998 61 0.001
Detection of an adblocker 19 0.002 0.001 0.999 1 2.157
Firebug resource detection 3 0.037 0.000 1.000 1 0.055
YahooToolbar resource detection 3 0.037 0.000 1.000 1 0.056
EasyScreenshot resource detection 3 0.037 0.000 1.000 1 0.056
Ghostery resource detection 3 0.037 0.000 1.000 1 0.057
Kaspersky resource detection 3 0.037 0.000 1.000 1 0.057
VideoDownloadHelper resource detection 3 0.038 0.001 0.998 1 0.057
GTranslate resource detection 3 0.037 0.000 1.000 1 0.059
Privowny resource detection 2 0.037 0.000 1.000 1 0.059
Privowny page content change 3 0.000 0.000 1.000 3 2.170
UBlock page content change 4 0.000 0.000 1.000 1 2.183
Pinterest page content change 10 0.001 0.001 0.999 1 2.153
Grammarly page content change 3 0.000 0.000 1.000 1 2.184
Adguard page content change 3 0.000 0.000 1.000 1 2.165
Evernote page content change 3 0.000 0.000 1.000 1 2.181
TOTL page content change 3 0.000 0.000 1.000 1 2.181
IE Tab page content change 11 0.000 0.000 1.000 1 2.156
WebRTC fingerprinting 671,254 0.294 0.144 0.765 1 0.764
WG.SHADING_LANGUAGE_VERSION 23 0.103 0.000 0.996 18 0.001
WG.VERSION 247 0.123 0.008 0.995 10 0.000
WG.VENDOR 11 0.080 0.000 0.997 7 0.000
WG.RENDERER 14 0.089 0.000 0.996 12 0.000
WG.ALIASED_POINT_SIZE_RANGE 42 0.129 0.006 0.996 5 0.000
WG.ALIASED_LINE_WIDTH_RANGE 30 0.077 0.003 0.996 3 0.000
WM.VIEWPORT_DIMS 13 0.107 0.009 0.995 11 0.000
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WG.SUBPIXEL_BITS 9 0.039 0.001 0.997 1 0.000
WG.SAMPLE_BUFFERS 5 0.039 0.000 0.996 1 0.000
WG.SAMPLES 9 0.075 0.001 0.992 1 0.000
WG.COMPRESSED_TEXTURE_FORMATS 3 0.034 0.000 0.998 23 0.000
WM.VERTEX_UNIFORM_ATTRIBUTES 18 0.118 0.006 0.996 3 0.000
WM.COMBINED_TEXTURE_IMAGE_UNITS 19 0.079 0.003 0.996 2 0.000
WM.FRAGMENT_UNIFORM_ATTRIBUTES 18 0.109 0.004 0.996 3 0.000
WM.CUBE_MAP_TEXTURE_SIZE 11 0.084 0.008 0.995 5 0.000
WG.STENCIL_VALUE_MASK 8 0.050 0.000 0.996 10 0.000
WG.STENCIL_WRITEMASK 7 0.050 0.000 0.996 10 0.000
WG.STENCIL_BACK_VALUE_MASK 8 0.050 0.000 0.996 10 0.000
WG.STENCIL_BACK_WRITEMASK 7 0.050 0.000 0.996 10 0.000
WM.TEXTURE_SIZE 10 0.081 0.009 0.995 5 0.000
WG.DEPTH_BITS 7 0.047 0.000 0.996 2 0.000
WM.VARYING_ATTRIBUTES 19 0.121 0.009 0.996 2 0.000
WI.COLOR_READ_FORMAT 7 0.073 0.003 0.994 4 0.000
WM.RENDERBUFFER_SIZE 11 0.080 0.003 0.995 5 0.000
WG.STENCIL_BITS 5 0.016 0.000 0.997 1 0.000
WM.TEXTURE_IMAGE_UNITS 7 0.033 0.000 0.997 2 0.000
WM.VERTEX_ATTRIBS 8 0.017 0.000 0.997 2 0.000
WM.VERTEX_TEXTURE_IMAGE_UNITS 9 0.057 0.001 0.996 2 0.000
WI.COLOR_READ_TYPE 6 0.041 0.000 0.996 4 0.000
WM.TEXTURE_MAX_ANISOTROPY_EXT 9 0.029 0.000 0.997 2 0.001
WG.getContextAttributes() 54 0.114 0.009 0.995 138 0.000
WG.getSupportedExtensions() 535 0.209 0.027 0.990 401 0.008
WG.[...].UNMASKED_VENDOR_WEBGL 27 0.115 0.000 0.995 9 0.000
WG.[...].UNMASKED_RENDERER_WEBGL 3,786 0.268 0.073 0.991 20 0.000
WebGL precision format 25 0.071 0.001 0.996 114 0.001
Our designed WebGL canvas 1,158 0.263 0.023 0.990 64 0.041
Width and position of a created div 17,832 0.324 nan 0.940 18 0.086
Colors of layout components 7,707 0.153 nan 0.986 492 0.090
Size of bounding boxes of a created div 16,396 0.369 nan 0.470 31 0.195
Presence of fonts 17,960 0.305 0.110 0.996 198 0.456
Support of video codecs 84 0.114 0.001 0.999 78 0.002
Support of audio codecs 52 0.128 0.002 0.999 61 0.001
Support of streaming codecs 50 0.132 0.010 0.999 133 0.002
Support of recording codecs 7 0.069 0.000 0.999 140 0.001
W.speechSynthesis.getVoices() 3,967 0.204 0.034 0.945 250 0.550
N.plugins 314,518 0.394 0.100 0.950 134 0.001
N.mimeTypes 174,876 0.311 0.017 0.982 112 0.000
A.state 5 0.082 0.000 0.999 7 0.000
A.sampleRate 16 0.070 0.019 0.997 5 0.000
AD.channelCount 5 0.036 0.000 1.000 1 0.000
AD.channelCountMode 4 0.036 0.000 1.000 8 0.000
AD.channelInterpretation 4 0.036 0.000 1.000 8 0.000
AD.maxChannelCount 20 0.058 0.003 1.000 1 0.000
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AD.numberOfInputs 3 0.035 0.000 1.000 1 0.000
AD.numberOfOutputs 3 0.035 0.000 1.000 1 0.000
AA.channelCount 5 0.067 0.000 1.000 1 0.001
AA.channelCountMode 5 0.037 0.000 1.000 3 0.000
AA.channelInterpretation 4 0.036 0.000 1.000 8 0.000
AA.numberOfInputs 4 0.036 0.000 1.000 1 0.000
AA.numberOfOutputs 4 0.036 0.000 1.000 1 0.000
AA.fftSize 3 0.035 0.000 1.000 4 0.000
AA.frequencyBinCount 3 0.035 0.000 1.000 4 0.000
AA.maxDecibels 3 0.035 0.000 1.000 3 0.000
AA.minDecibels 3 0.035 0.000 1.000 4 0.000
AA.smoothingTimeConstant 4 0.046 0.000 0.998 3 0.000
Audio fp simple 337 0.153 0.004 0.958 18 1.403
Audio fp advanced 561 0.147 0.001 0.953 17 1.636
Audio fp advanced frequency data 546 0.161 0.011 0.950 17 1.639
Our designed HTML5 canvas (PNG) 269,874 0.420 0.021 0.922 64 0.260
Our designed HTML5 canvas (JPEG) 205,005 0.399 0.001 0.936 64 0.265
HTML5 canvas inspired by AmIUnique (PNG) 8,948 0.353 0.002 0.986 64 0.031
HTML5 canvas inspired by AmIUnique (JPEG) 6,514 0.312 0.001 0.989 64 0.039
HTML5 canvas similar to Morellian (PNG) 41,845 0.385 0.034 0.947 64 0.037
Accept HTTP header 26 0.028 0.000 0.997 3 0.000
Accept-Encoding HTTP header 30 0.019 0.002 1.000 13 0.000
Accept-Language HTTP header 2,833 0.124 0.022 0.999 35 0.000
User-Agent HTTP header 20,961 0.350 0.002 0.978 108 0.000
Accept-Charset HTTP header 18 0.002 0.000 1.000 1 0.000
Cache-Control HTTP header 47 0.055 0.023 0.706 1 0.000
Connection HTTP header 2 0.000 0.000 1.000 5 0.000
TE HTTP header 2 0.000 0.000 1.000 1 0.000
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests HTTP header 2 0.000 0.000 1.000 1 0.000
X-WAP-Profile HTTP header 4 0.000 0.000 1.000 1 0.000
X-Requested-With HTTP header 151 0.004 0.000 1.000 1 0.000
X-ATT-DeviceId HTTP header 1 0.000 0.000 1.000 1 0.000
X-UIDH HTTP header 1 0.000 0.000 1.000 1 0.000
X-Network-Info HTTP header 4 0.000 0.000 1.000 1 0.000
Via HTTP header 4,272 0.007 0.003 0.999 1 0.000
Any conditional HTTP headers 5,394 0.095 0.042 0.899 192 0.000
Number of bounding boxes 15 0.062 0.008 0.998 1 0.195
Number of plugins 54 0.147 0.000 0.984 1 0.001
Number of WebGL extensions 28 0.176 0.000 0.991 2 0.008
Width and height of first bounding box 12,937 0.350 nan 0.486 30 0.195
Width and height of second bounding box 1,332 0.103 nan 0.941 1 0.195
Width and height of third bounding box 772 0.076 nan 0.965 1 0.195
List of widths of bounding boxes 6,690 0.299 nan 0.986 16 0.195
List of heights of bounding boxes 2,222 0.264 nan 0.474 14 0.195
Width of first bounding box 4,418 0.281 0.038 0.987 14 0.195
Height of first bounding box 1,848 0.246 0.070 0.490 14 0.195
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article . Publication date: June 2020.
A Large-scale Empirical Analysis of Browser Fingerprints Properties for Web Authentication 51
Attribute Values N. Ent. MNCE % Same Size Time
Width of second bounding box 471 0.085 0.002 0.998 1 0.195
Height of second bounding box 398 0.088 0.007 0.941 1 0.195
Width of third bounding box 224 0.060 0.004 0.999 1 0.195
Height of third bounding box 343 0.064 0.000 0.966 1 0.195
Width of a created div 15,473 0.316 0.007 0.940 6 0.086
Origin of a created div 16,375 0.316 0.008 0.942 11 0.086
Width of fallback font text 1,029 0.184 0.024 0.998 5 0.100
Height of fallback font text 1,159 0.164 0.010 0.998 5 0.100
Color of ActiveBorder element 702 0.078 0.005 1.000 18 0.090
Color of ActiveCaption element 475 0.073 0.002 1.000 18 0.090
Color of AppWorkspace element 321 0.067 0.001 1.000 18 0.090
Color of Background element 2,917 0.074 0.017 1.000 16 0.090
Color of ButtonFace element 297 0.079 0.004 1.000 18 0.090
Color of ButtonHighlight element 264 0.058 0.000 1.000 18 0.090
Color of ButtonShadow element 343 0.076 0.001 1.000 18 0.090
Color of ButtonText element 104 0.004 0.000 1.000 12 0.090
Color of CaptionText element 123 0.014 0.000 1.000 12 0.090
Color of GrayText element 333 0.071 0.004 1.000 18 0.090
Color of Highlight element 1,088 0.097 0.016 0.987 17 0.090
Color of HighlightText element 89 0.049 0.001 1.000 18 0.090
Color of InactiveBorder element 334 0.060 0.000 1.000 18 0.090
Color of InactiveCaption element 441 0.062 0.001 1.000 18 0.090
Color of InactiveCaptionText element 265 0.088 0.006 0.999 15 0.090
Color of InfoBackground element 239 0.057 0.000 1.000 18 0.090
Color of InfoText element 96 0.003 0.000 1.000 12 0.090
Color of Menu element 376 0.087 0.004 1.000 18 0.090
Color of MenuText element 124 0.020 0.001 1.000 12 0.090
Color of Scrollbar element 275 0.072 0.000 1.000 18 0.090
Color of ThreeDDarkShadow element 75 0.071 0.001 1.000 18 0.090
Color of ThreeDFace element 297 0.062 0.000 1.000 18 0.090
Color of ThreeDHighlight element 261 0.048 0.000 1.000 18 0.090
Color of ThreeDLightShadow element 280 0.074 0.001 1.000 18 0.090
Color of ThreeDShadow element 339 0.075 0.000 1.000 18 0.090
Color of Window element 329 0.019 0.001 1.000 18 0.090
Color of WindowFrame element 140 0.069 0.000 1.000 18 0.090
Color of WindowText element 107 0.004 0.000 1.000 12 0.090
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